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In the London Gazette Extraordinary, in which were published, by the government, the several documents relating to the late Conventions in Portugal, the Armistice, which was the basis of all that followed, and which, as far as it was departed from, in the subsequent negociations, was rendered less injurious and disgraceful; this Armistice, which was, on our part, negociated by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and which bore his signature; this Armistice was published, was, by the government, communicated to the people of England, in the French language only, while all the other documents were, in the very same Gazette Extraordinary, published in the English language only.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.—The fact, a statement of which I have placed at the head of this present Number of my work, should be constantly borne in mind by every man in this disgraced and abused country. It has been the subject of much conversation and inquiry; it was a thing, of which the ministers must have been desirous to give, or cause to be given, a satisfactory explanation; it is notorious, that a whole month has now elapsed without the appearance of even any attempt at such explanation; and, therefore, the public are justified in concluding, that their intention, from the first, was to do all in their power to screen Wellesley, let what would become of his associates in the never-to-be-forgotten transaction. Whether they will persevere in this their evident intention we shall soon see; probably I shall be able to perceive it even before this article be finished; for, the hero of Oude being arrived, his newspaper will not be long in making known to us what we have to expect with respect to him.—In the meanwhile, let us attend to some points which have escaped us.—The dispatch, giving an account of the victories in Portugal, were dated on the 22d of August; the bearer of that dispatch could not have come away before that day; on that very day the armistice was negociated and *concluded*, and yet the bearer of the dispatch *brought no account of the armistice*. Was not this something very singular? Say, that the bearer was ready to come off in the morning, and that the armistice was not concluded until night. But, if there were no vessel ready to send off with another messenger at night, why was not the bearer kept until night, that the *consequence* of the victory as well as the victory itself might have been announced to us at the same time? What injury to the service could possibly have arisen from the delay of a few hours in the departure of this messenger? Nay, what possible inconvenience could have therefrom arisen? Sir Arthur Wellesley would not, indeed, have enjoyed the praises of this gulled nation for the space of a week; a strong and unjust public persuasion, in his favour, would not have been excited; but that is all, that is all the mischief that could possibly have arisen from the delay.—But, *was there a delay?* I doubt it. Did not the bearer of the dispatch bear also the account of the armistice, in substance if not in form? It is my opinion that he did. Ships do not move off at a moment's warning, like post-chaises. The armistice must have been concluded before the bearer of the bragging dispatch left Portugal; and, though it would have been of little use, perhaps, to send forward the document in due form, yet the *substance* of it might have been added to the dispatch, and it is not credible that it was not added. My belief, therefore, is, that the substance of the armistice was made known to Lord Castlereagh through the bearer of the dispatch; and that he, not being bound to communicate that substance to the public, suffered us to go on, for as long a time as possible, applauding the conduct of Wellesley.—I do not wish to strain any thing. I have no other motive; I *can have* no other motive, than that of a desire to see impartial justice done; but, this appears to me to be the fact, and, if it be so, the public ought to bear it in mind; because it is a circumstance strongly corroborating the opinion, now generally prevalent, that the ministry, or *a part* of them at least, have intended and, probably, do intend, to screen Wellesley at all events.—From motives, which will, by-and-bye, become apparent enough, the friends of Wellesley are now questioning the practicability of reducing Junot within any reasonable space of time; and a correspondent, whose letter will be found in another part of this double Number of the Register, sets himself seriously to work to controvert the opinion which I gave, to wit, that, after reading Wellesley's dispatch, we had a right to expect, by the *next arrival*, an account of the unconditional

surrender of the French. Did any one imagine, that, by the "next arrival," I meant, or could mean, the very next vessel that should come into port from the shores of Portugal? I meant, by the next bearer of dispatches from our army; the next bearer of any intelligence of importance; and, I appeal to the language of the press, at the time Wellesley's dispatch was received, for a proof that such was the expectation generally entertained.——But, was it a *reasonable* expectation? That is the question; and it is, observe, a question which lies entirely between *Wellesley* and the public, the other commanders having had no hand in the bragging dispatch.—— My correspondent now tells me of *twenty* or more than twenty thousand men, whom Junot had under his command. But, Wellesley told us, that, with *half* his force, before he was joined by Burrard, he beat "*the whole* of the French force, commanded "by the *Duc d'Abrantes in person.*" I should like to have seen him when he penned this last quoted sentence. "By the Duc d'A-"brantes *in person!*" How he braced up, I dare say, and repeated the words to himself, with an air of pomposity so inseparable from his sect. "In *person!*" Why, if there had been an army of a hundred thousand men, commanded by emperors, the language and manner could not have been more pompous. Some one has observed, that the giving of this title to Junot proceeded solely from the vanity of Wellesley; as if nothing short of a Duke were worthy of the honour of measuring swords with a Wellesley; and, indeed, it seems difficult to attribute to any other motive, this cutting and flagrant insult to a prince and a people, whom we went out to rescue from insult and oppression.—— To return from this digression: it matters little what were the *numbers* of Junot's force at the date of the negociation; for, whether many or few, "*the whole*" of his force had been beaten by "*one half*" of the force of Wellesley, and we know, that the force of the latter became double in number, or nearly double, previous to the signing of the Convention. It is a fact pretty generally known, that when transports are demanded, *double tonnage* is expected. Besides, the number is now swelled out with all sorts of persons, persons, who, observe, shut up in forts, would have been a dead weight upon him; and yet my correspondent chooses to believe, that Junot could have brought twenty thousand men into the field, though it was positively stated, that he retreated with his whole force before one half of Wellesley's army; that is to say, before less than nine thousand men. After all, however, we return to the point: be his force what it might, the whole of it was beaten by about one third of the force that we had at the time of making the Convention; the whole of it was beaten but the day before by one third of that force, amongst whom were the very men who had beaten him; this is the fact, or.... Wellesley told this nation, this credulous and abused nation, a shameful lie.——Well, says this new defender of Wellesley, but of what avail would have been a superiority of force? We should not have made Junot surrender any thing the sooner on account of great superiority of numbers.——No? Why then, the complete power of cutting off succours and of preventing the chance of sallies would, in the hands of our generals, have been useless? Besides, what are this gentleman's ideas of a siege? It is, for the most part, a very vulgar affair; an affair much more resembling ditching and draining than any thing else; and, as two labourers will do twice as much at ditching in a day than one labourer will do, so thirty thousand men will, in the same space, do twice as much at making trenches, approaches, and batteries, as fifteen thousand men. We have, moreover, the authority of that great man, Sir Hew, one of whose motives for coming to terms with Junot was, that there was a *doubt*, whether Sir John Moore's division could be landed at the time. Now, acceding to the notion of my correspondent, more men were not only not necessary, but absolutely useless for the purpose of any operation that could, at the time alluded to, be in contemplation.——But for the purpose of *storming*, would not superiority of numbers have been an advantage? Or, has not this mode of attack yet found its way into the practice of our armies? Why do we raise all these men; why do we pay *ten thousand officers*; why have we a staff superior in numbers, and very far superior in expence, to Buonaparte, if we are never to hear of any enterprize of this sort? The greater part of the forts in Portugal, if my information be correct, were things to be taken by storm, with the loss of perhaps a thousand men for each attack of this kind; and, it will require very ample and very credible evidence to convince me, that, with such an army, with thirty thousand men, so able-bodied and so accustomed to labour, with such a train of artillery, and with the whole of the strength, labour, and resources of the country at our disposal, not to mention a considerable army of Portuguese actually embodied; it

will require much indeed to convince me, that, with such means, our generals might not, *in the course of one week*, have carried a mine under the rampart of Junot's strongest fortress. There would have been no regular investiture necessary; no line of circumvallation; none of the precautions usually adopted in cases of regular siege; because *sallies* and *succours* were out of the question. Did ever man conceive, that, under such circumstances, a breach could not be made in six days? Never; and, when my correspondent reminds me of Saragossa and other open towns, which have exhibited to the world instances of long and successful resistance, my answer is, that it has not been owing to the strength of the *place*, but to the strength and courage of the defenders. Let him shew me an instance, wherein the assailant had, with a third of his force, beaten the assailed but the day before, and had all the country around for friends, while his enemy had nothing but enemies within and without; let him shew me an instance like this, wherein a successful, or a long, defence has been maintained, and I will say, that he has advanced something worth listening to; but, for an instance of this sort he will search history in vain.——As if for the purpose of furnishing us with a striking instance of the miserable shifts, to which the partizans of Sir Arthur Wellesley are driven (for *he* must, at last, stand responsible for the Convention), this writer reminds me, that the people of Lisbon, the dear good folks of Lisbon, were at the mercy of Junot; and, that it was our duty to prevent him, by any means whatever, from committing any cruelties upon them, which cruelties he might have committed, if we had refused him such terms as he demanded. It is pity that this argument has been so long delayed; for it would have applied equally well against sending the expedition to Portugal, where it has, at an enormous expence, purchased us deep disgrace, and done infinite injustice and injury to our allies of Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Indeed, it would apply against every attempt to drive the enemy out of any town or place. It is a sweeping argument; the universal argument of the coward: "I "would attack you, but I am afraid of the "consequences." What! did not Junot well know, that, at last, he must become really responsible for all the cruelties he committed upon the people of Lisbon? Did he not know, that we had cords to hang with and muskets to shoot with? Or, was he apprized, by any means, that we were so gentle a people, or had committed our armies to the care and command of generals so gentle, that he had only to play the bully, the robber, and the murderer, and had nothing to apprehend in the way of retaliation? Judge, reader, of the badness of a cause, in support of which such an argument is resorted to ——But, as the reader will perceive, we are now, it seems, to answer those who defend *the Convention*, not those who execrate the Convention and defend Wellesley. Reader, we have heard the defenders of Wellesley assert, in the most positive manner, that he *protested* against the Convention, and against any compromise at all with the French; that he had nothing to do with negociating the armistice which he signed; that the French general wrote it out with his own hand; that Dalrymple, at Kellerman's request, *commanded* Wellesley to put his signature to it; and, that, after very earnest remonstrances, he finally yielded obedience to the hateful command. Those defenders have plyed us with dissertations upon military discipline; they have told us, that absolute power in the chief and implicit obedience in his inferiors are the soul of an army; and, calling in the terrible to the aid of the persuasive, they have reminded us, that if poor Sir Arthur had disobeyed the mighty Sir Hew, the latter might have run him through the body! Did they not assert and reason thus? Nay, the gaudy, chariot-lounging, the painted and piano-playing strumpets about town, who, as part of their regular calling, deal in the pathetic as well as in lies, trumped up a story of Sir Arthur's going upon his knees to prevail upon Sir Hew not to bring such a disgrace upon his country. Did not his defenders say, that he was to be considered, as to the Armistice, as no more responsible than the clerk of an attorney or a banker, who signs a document or draft in the name of his master? Did they not throw all the blame, all the responsibility, upon Sir Hew, whose fame they blasted, and whose carcase they threw down before us, to be trampled and spit upon? Did they not, in support of their great assertion respecting the Protest, first publish and then quote, as from vouchers of undoubted authenticity, numerous extracts of "*letters from the army*," the whole of which extracts spoke of the famous Protest, blamed Sir Hew and Burrard, but were particularly strong and clear as to the Protest? Every sycophant in London had this Protest upon his lips. Protest, Protest, "the *gallant* Sir "Arthur's Protest," the "Conqueror of "Vimeira's Protest!" This was the cry through the regions of Whitehall, and was faithfully echoed by the punks of the squares,

——Well, then, now he is come; not *recalled*, but *come*. He is come home to tell his own story. We, before, called upon his defenders to produce us his Protest; but we now call upon himself. Now, then, Mr. "*conqueror* of Vimeira;" now, then, "*gallant* Sir Arthur;" now, then, you whose friends have hazarded political infamy for your sake; now, then, produce this Protest to us; and, if you cannot, tell us, whose labour, whose sweat and pain and misery have supported the vast expence of the expedition; tell us *why* you signed the armistice of the 22d of August, after having beaten with "*half*" your force, "the "*whole* of the French force, commanded "by the Duc D'Abrantes *in person*." Come, Sir, none of your haughty Eastern airs. None of your disdainful silence. That will not serve your turn. Your friends have asserted, that you made *a Protest*. Where is it? Shew it us. Tell us of what it consisted; or acknowledge that those friends, in wittingly asserting what was false, with a view of saving your reputation at the expence of your associates, have proved themselves to be the very greatest scoundrels that ever infested the earth, and that they merit the gallows and the gibbet more than any malefactor, whose name and deeds stand recorded in the annals of Newgate. "Letters "from persons of *high honour* in the army!" Vile miscreants! To go thus coolly and deliberately to work in the hatching, the completing, and the publishing of a set of corresponding lies! It is impossible to proceed. No words can do justice to conduct like this.—The reader will perceive, that the same set of worse than felonious villains are now at work upon "further letters from the "army and navy." The *protest* is not now spoken of. The tone is softened. *No great blame* upon any body, except the poor Portuguese. Take a specimen.——"Ex- "tract of a letter from an officer of *distinction* "on board *one* of his majesty's ships, just "arrived from Lisbon.—Yesterday I got "some papers, in which I perceive Sir A. "Wellesley's conduct in the suspension of "arms, is most unjustly confounded with "the final treaty. The first, he signed *at "the immediate desire of Sir Hew Dal- "rymple*; but with the latter he had nothing "to do at all. The whole was *contrary to "his opinion*. The motives by which he "has been influenced, are *highly honour- "able to his feelings*. In short, your news- "papers are *all ill-informed* of the state of "affairs at the time; and I believe most "persons will be astonished when they "know that the French embarkation, after "all their losses, amounted to 25,000 men. "And you may depend upon it, *the Por- "tuguese army availed ours nothing*; and "there *never was a symptom of revolt "in favour of us*. I mean not to defend "the treaty—it is a disgraceful and an in- "famous one; but as the *principal object* "was obtained, there need not have been "the *outcry* which appears to have been "made in the country. As to the Russian "fleet, that is in our possession. I think, "if Sir C. Cotton had not orders from "home, he has done wrong; but if our "generous conduct is the means of for- "warding *our negociations* for a peace with "Russia, it will be hereafter considered as "a good act."——I beg the reader to look upon this as a sham letter; but, what a pretty fellow this officer of "*distinction*" must be, if the letter be real. You see, the fellow, who has been base enough to palm this letter upon the public, dares not *name* either the writer, or the *ship* that he is on board of. All that is here said about *fine feelings*, an *ill-informed press*, and the *policy of not fighting* is, to be sure, but too characteristic of but too many "officers of "*distinction*;" yet not of the navy. The slander upon the Portuguese, however, is worthy of marked reprobation. It was exactly thus, that the Pittite crew uniformly treated the French royalists. They first inveigled them into a state of dependance; and then they belied and betrayed them. Does the man, who has published this pretended letter "from an officer of distinction" in the navy, think that such statements will not be resented by the Portuguese? But, what cares he? He has his pay for the use of his dirty columns, and that is all he wants. ——Well, but what are *we* doing? What part are we acting? We, the people of this fine "free country," who live under a constitution that is, as Pitt used to say, at the end of his speeches, "the greatest "blessing that a benign Providence ever "bestowed upon man." Upon himself, I suppose, he meant. But, what are we, free fellows as we are; what are we doing? We have been talking for a long while; we have been fretting and fuming and scolding and crying like women, or rather like Italian men, like Jews and Genoese, who, when they are kicked and cuffed, scold and run and run and scold. Here it will end, and that our masters well know. There has been a little stir, owing to Mr. WAITHMAN, in the city of London; but, we shall not *now* see the example followed, as it was, the other day, when the object was to *praise* the conduct of those in power. *Then* we had

Old Rose galloping down into Hampshire, calling meetings, and assembling his sycophants from far and near. Now they are as still as mice. Over a bottle, the servants being gone and the doors shut, they look wise, shake their heads, assume a bluff countenance, and begin to talk big; but, the reptiles dare not stir an inch. One wants a sinecure, another a pension, another a place for his son, another a contract, another a living, another a ribbon or a star. They dare not stir. They are the basest slaves that ever disgraced the earth. Let them be told, that the ministry wish them to address, or petition, against the Conventions in Portugal, and you will see them pouring forth in hundreds, as bold as heroes, looking as big and talking as bold as if every individual of them felt himself strong enough to overset a church steeple. Oh, the base wretches! Well, they suffer for it. They are pretty decently peculated upon, and their continual anxiety, their constant fear of displeasing, their perpetual dependance, is a sort of hell upon earth. Yet, now, you shall hear these miserable slaves talk about freedom, about the birthright of Britons, and about our glorious constitution, in as good terms as you could wish to hear. This is a part of their punishment. They are compelled to belie their hearts. They are slaves, and compelled to assume occasionally the appearance of being free.——This does not apply to Hampshire alone. It is, with very few exceptions, applicable to the whole kingdom. There is, it appears, to be a meeting in *Essex*, and, if it produce a good, plain, manly complaint, unaccompanied with nauseous common-place flattery of the king and his family, which would be not less dishonourable in him to receive than in the county of Essex to offer, it will be a fit subject for commendation; but, it will not, I am afraid, meet with much imitation. The same influence that sent Wellesley and his comrade Convention-makers to Portugal; that influence which has done so much upon other occasions, will not fail to be exerted now. Indeed, it exerts itself. It is sown all over the country, as regularly as corn is sown in a field. Seventy millions a year are, in one way and another, spent by the government. The government employs and pays all, and it receives all. There is a chain of dependance running through the whole nation, which, though not every where seen, is everywhere felt. There is not one man in one thousand who does not feel the weight of this chain. Army, navy, church, the law, sinecures, pensions, tax offices, war and navy offices, Whitehall, India-house, Bank, contract, job, &c. &c. Who is there, who is not himself, or who has not a son, a brother, or some relation or other, employed and paid by, dependent for bread upon, the minister of the day? Those means by which men formerly maintained their sons and relations, and by which a country gentry were supported in a state of independence, are now drawn away in taxes; and, in order to find a maintenance, those sons and relations must now go and serve the ministry, in some capacity or other; must go and crouch to them, and receive from them, in the shape of pension or of hire, a share of that income, which has been drawn, in taxes, from their parents, or other natural supporters. This is the state in which we are. There needs no trouble, on the part of the ministry, upon an occasion like the present. They know well, that the country *cannot* stir; because they know that, generally speaking, he who stirs must, if they please, starve. Hence it is, that our anger seems always to evaporate in noise; that, like a mob, we hollow and bawl and threaten *when no one can distinguish one of us from the other*, and that, the moment we are put individually to the test, we, by conduct, if not by words, deny having had any share in the clamour. And, does it become *us* to scoff at the slavery of other nations? We are exceedingly bold in reproaching the French with their abject submission; but, let me put this question to you, reader: What do you think the French government would have done, had its generals made such a convention as ours have made? Pause a little, and then answer that question. Well, now for another. Suppose, that the French government had not discovered any anger at such conduct in its generals, but seemed, as far as the people could judge, to be resolved to screen them; what do you think the French *people* would have done in that case? "Held their tongues," say you. So they would, and so shall we. That is to say, they would have gabbled about the disgrace in their coffee-houses and at their tables, but would have said not a word to their government; and what have we done more? And, if our conduct be, in effect, the same as theirs, under similar circumstances, would have been, of what consequence is it, what difference is it as a question of *freedom*, whether men be kept in awe by the terrors of the naked sword, or by the terrors of starvation? Of all the proofs of a state of slavery, none is so complete as that of *not daring to complain when one is aggrieved.* The French, we say, dare not complain,

and therefore we call them slaves. Well, then, if we *do not* now make our complaints, we are in this dilemma: either we dare not complain, or we dare: if the former we are slaves; if the latter, we are the basest of hypocrites. Who will believe in the *reality* of our sorrow and indignation at the Conventions in Portugal? What Portuguese or Spaniard or Swede will be fool enough to give credit to any of our noisy professions of regard for the interests of our allies? No one. Not a man of the three nations. We must *do* something; or, whatever we may think of ourselves, they will look upon us as a people pretty fairly represented by the convention-making generals. To this we may make up our minds. The world will hear none of our excuses. They will not be able to hear the piteous stories of those who have places and pensions and contracts and jobs, who have sons to push forward, who have manifold dependents for whom to provide. Of all these the world will hear nothing. The world knows that we have made a great, a loud, a furious clamour against the Conventions in Portugal; that world has been told that we are a people perfectly *free*; and, if we do not *act* as well as make a mob-like noise, the world will have the good sense and the justice to regard us *as slaves*, or *as hypocrites*.——It is said, that Sir Hew is arrived. It was time; for, in my opinion, his *Proclamation* is even worse than the Conventions. What! take upon us to rule the country and *punish the people*, unless they submit to men set over them by us! But, I have not time to go into this subject at present.

Spain.——We have, then, at last, sent an *envoy* to Spain. In the first place, we have sent the very man, Mr. John Hookham Frere, who was there when the last quarrel with Spain took place, and when we attacked and seized their richly-laden ships, before a declaration of war had been made.——In the next place, *to whom* do we send him? Why, the Gazette tells us, that "the king has "been pleased to nominate and appoint the "right hon. John Hookham Frere to be his "majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister "plenipotentiary *to his catholic majesty Ferdinand the VIIth*, and has been pleased to "direct him to reside in that character at the "seat of the central and supreme Junta in "Spain." So. We do acknowledge, then,—that a man may be legally unkinged, and that another may be put up in his stead? Thus is the doctrine of cashiering kings, which gave so much offence, some years ago; and the promulgation of which caused so many persons to be punished in England, openly recognised by a solemn act of the government of England. Ferdinand and Charles are both alive; they are both out of Spain; they are both in France; both have abdicated the throne in favour of the Buonaparte dynasty. Now, why do we prefer Ferdinand to Charles? Why simply for this reason, because *the people*, or some of them, say that they wish to have the former, while none of them say that they wish to have the latter. It is pretended, that Ferdinand's right to the throne is founded upon the abdication which Charles made in his favour; but, Charles, the moment he was out of the hands of Ferdinand and his partizans, *protested* against that abdication, and declared that it was extorted from him with the knife at his throat. Upon that abdication, therefore, we can build no right for Ferdinand, without, by the same act, destroying the superstructure; for, if Ferdinand, by the abdication of Charles in his favour, became rightful sovereign of Spain, Joseph Buonaparte became the rightful sovereign of Spain in virtue of the abdication of Ferdinand. Both abdications I believe to have been extorted; but, while we have a protest of the abdicating party against the former, we have none against the latter. Were he at liberty, we should, I dare say, have it; but, we are not quite sure of that, while we are in actual possession of the protest of poor old Charles. It is clear, therefore, that, in point of hereditary right, Charles is king of Spain; and that, in acknowledging the latter to be king, we have acknowledged a right in the people of Spain to cashier their kings.——But, the most interesting point is this: why do we choose to send an envoy to *any king* of Spain? From the first I have feared, I have expressed my fears, that the contest, as far as we were concerned, would be another contest for *a king*; and, who can say how far the leading men in Spain may, by *our interference*, have been induced to make it a war for a choice of kings, instead of a war of freedom against despotism? It was not, observe, until after *our agents* went to Spain, that there was much talk about Ferdinand. Until then a *reform of abuses* was the main object which the people appeared to have in view; and the public will recollect, that they spoke of their "late *infamous government*," uncoupled with any exceptions whatever.——It must be acknowledged, that an English minister is to consider, how, in this war, the exertions of England are to be made most effectually to contribute towards the permanent safety and greatness of England, provided no wrong be done to any

ally. If, therefore, it appeared, that to make war for Ferdinand was the most likely way of succeeding in this object, it was right to make war for him. But, I do not think, that this *did appear*. To me it has always appeared, that, for Spain to frustrate the views of Napoleon, to baffle and to mortify and to humble him, and to give an encouraging example to the rest of Europe, the war should have been a war of freedom against despotism. Between Joseph and Ferdinand many people will see but little difference; and many more will ask, what government could have been worse than that which the Spaniards themselves have declared to have been infamous?——It seems to me, therefore, that the English ministry ought to have wished that the names of Ferdinand and Charles should be totally left out of the contest.——It is not to be believed, that *the people* will fight and endure for the sake of either of their kings. They *must* perceive, that the result of the contest is of comparatively little importance to *them*; and, the moment they do so view the thing, there is an end to their exertions. ——But, so think not Lloyds' and Whitehall. They are for a war for a king. Good luck to them; but, they will be kind enough to excuse me, if I feel a little less anxious for the fate of the man, who surrendered the sword of Francis I. to "His Serene Highness, the Grand Duke "of Berg," than I felt for the fate of so many millions of men, who appeared to me to be fighting for that freedom, which a set of degenerate despots had so long withheld from them.——There has appeared, and will be inserted below if I have room, a paper, entitled an EXPOSITION OF FACTS, (relating to the usurpation of the crown of Spain by Napoleon) from the pen of DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, who, it must be confessed, has been most advantageously situated for the purpose, having been Secretary of State for foreign affairs, to the three kings, Charles, Ferdinand, and Joseph, and who is now in high favour, it would seem, with the Junta and with our people. Mr Pedro tells a tough story. Much too tough to be examined in the time that I have, at present, to spare for the purpose; but, I must say, even now, that there wants a good deal to convince me, that it is that "*true* and *artless* tale," that the London newspaper editors appear to think it. "A "man cannot serve *two* masters," says the Gospel; but, Don Pedro has served *three*. Bother me not, ye whining calumniators, with your insinuations that I dislike this man because he has exposed Buonaparte; insinuate or say or swear what you will, you shall never make me affect to believe what appears to me to be incredible, merely because it comes from a man who attacks Buonaparte. Falsehood is falsehood, if spoken of the devil himself.——Don Pedro not only served three masters, but was confided in by all the three. He gives us an account of some conversations between him and Napoleon, and the Courier (I believe it is) observes, that we cannot have a better *proof* of his integrity, than the fact, that Napoleon reproached him for having too much of that quality. May be so; but, we really are, as yet, destitute of any proof *of that fact*; unless we take Mr. Cevallos's assertions for proofs, as the country folks in the House used to do with those of Pitt. Of one fact, however, we are quite certain, and that is, that Mr. Cevallos was chosen by this same Napoleon to be a confidential servant of king Joseph; and, I ask the reader, whether he believes, that this choice would have been made, if Napoleon had found the person chosen to be so firmly attached to his honour and to the welfare of Spain? ——Mr. Cevallos will have very much to answer me; but, for the present I shall content myself with a question or two. 1st. Was he carried *by force* to Bayonne? 2d. If he was not, how came he to repair thither at the request of Napoleon, after having been so intimately acquainted with all the previous machinations and detestable perfidies of Napoleon? 3d. How came he, who was the confidential minister of Ferdinand, to suffer that king to go to Bayonne without using his utmost endeavours to prevent it? 4th. How came Ferdinand to give up the sword of Francis I. to the "Grand Duke of Berg?" And, 5th, how came Mr. Cevallos himself to write and publish paper upon paper, addressed to the people of Spain, assuring them that all their jealousies of the French were groundless, for that the views of the Emperor were of the most friendly and affectionate sort: and this, too, at a time, when the "machinations" were going on, and when he was intimately acquainted with those machinations?——When Mr. Cevallos, or any one for him, has answered these questions, I have some more ready to put to him. But, whatever may have been the conduct of Buonaparte; however wicked and perfidious that may have been, I think, that it is evident enough, that Mr. Cevallos has all along had a desire to be upon the *strongest side*; that he deserted Joseph, because he

was persuaded that he was become the weakest; and that the whole story, some falsehood some truth, was written for the purpose of making his peace with the Spaniards and of again getting possession of power and emolument.——Now, reader, divest yourself, for a moment, of the desire to hear Buonaparte accused of infamous acts, and say, whether this be not, to all appearance, the real truth; and, if that should be your opinion, you will not, I am persuaded, think that there is virtue enough in this EXPOSITION to make it "a lever "wherewith to raise the world against the "Corsican Usurper;" but will, perhaps, think with me, that the principles of political freedom, laid down as the basis of the cause in Spain, is the only lever, by which that nation, and, by their example, the rest of Europe, can be raised effectually to oppose a military despot——Aye, the truth is; the truth that speaks with "voice "trumpet-tongue," though those in power will not hear it, is, that to raise the world against the despotism of Napoleon, you must show the world, you must give the world to see and feel, *something better than the despotism of Napoleon.*

Botley, 12*th Oct.* 1808.

CONVENTION OF PORTUGAL.

SIR;—It is impossible not to be satisfied, for the most part, with the clear, candid, and able manner in which you have examined the Articles of the Convention of Lisbon, and stated your opinion on the several circumstances connected with it, as far as they are hitherto authenticated; and, although you are very successful in applying the light to the flaws and hollow parts of several of the excuses urged in palliation of the act, you, nevertheless, do not appear to advance reasons sufficient to support your assertion, "that the people had a right to expect an unconditional surrender." After detailing the difficulties surmounted, and advantages obtained at the battle of Vimiera, you say: "When we are told all this, and were in-"formed that immediately after this bril-"liant success, our army was augmented to "nearly double what it had before been, "we naturally expected, that, by the next "arrival seeing that the enemy could re-"ceive no supplies by land or sea, we should "be informed of his surrender at discretion." Now, I cannot see how this could naturally be expected by the next arrival. It was clear from the London Gazette, announcing the repulse of the French at Vimiera, that the Tartar Junot was enabled to retire unmolested to his strong position, and there to concentrate his forces. Nay, the newspapers for several succeeding days contained invectives against Burrard for not permitting Wellesley to pursue and destroy the French army. And it is not necessary here to inquire whether any, or what advantage, was to be obtained by the pursuit, or, if any favourable moment was neglected, to whom the crime of such neglect attaches. It is sufficient to the consideration of the present question, that the possibility of Junot's safe arrival in his strong hold was placed beyond all doubt on the 3d September, and re-echoed throughout the kingdom in the interval between the 3d and 17th September. You state, that Junot's army, after the battle, might be 10,000, and the English 30,000, or thereabouts, which is, perhaps, nearly correct. The same scraps also, from which we ascertain that the cheek-scratched Duc D'Abrantes retreated with 10,000 men, inform us that nearly 3,000 men were left in these strong places, and that 7,000 Portuguese soldiers were in the French service, men who never attempted to prevent Junot's returning to his entrenchments. There were besides 5,600 Russian soldiers, unoffending neutrals certainly, men who would not engage in active hostility, as some of the papers have asserted; poor harmless creatures, who only confined 5000 Spanish soldiers on board their ships! These, collectively, compose a very formidable force; and allowing for every exaggeration, there appears no reason to doubt, but there were 20,000 men on whose active services Junot could rely. And I am even now entitled to ask, knowing the resolute and Tartar-like character of the Duke, and considering that his immense plunder was a most powerful motive to obstinate resistance, whether his situation was so deplorable and despair-creating, as to justify the public in expecting his surrender at discretion by the next arrival; an arrival, recollect, which was looked for a week before the 17th September: I shall, however, examine the reasons adduced by you in support of this general opinion. You ask, "since when did these places become so "very strong? Junot found no difficulty in "getting into them when he entered Por-"tugal with the same army, which Wel-"lesley told us he had beaten hollow, only "a few days before you made the Conven-"tion; nay, he marched into them, or ra-"ther over them. They have been quick "then, it seems, in growing into places of "such adamantine materials." It is almost unnecessary to observe, that this is no proof that the position was not strong when the English army appeared before it; nay, it is

no proof that it was not strong when Junot entered it at first; and with you rests the onus probandi. I do not purpose to enter into a detailed account of the circumtances under which Junot entered, and took possession of Lisbon; nor do I intend to quote the Prince Regent's Manifesto, and a variety of other documents to prove how he could have been resisted; and I am not aware of any reason why it may not be admitted, though contrary to the fact, that there was not, at the time Junot entered Portugal, one parapet in the whole kingdom, from behind which resistance could have been made with greater advantage than in the open field, if resistance had been determined on. There can, indeed, be no analogy between the situation of the French and English armies at the times they respectively entered the country. But since when did these places become so very strong? There is no reason to be astonished; Junot has been in Portugal long enough, and has not wanted means, without supernatural aid or the interposition of a necromancer, to erect fortifications, from which to dislodge him by the next arrival would require all the skill of English officers, and all the intrepidity of British soldiers. But, Sir, every account since Junot's arrival most fully concurred in representing him as particularly sedulous in repairing the old, and erecting new fortifications, and that he had rendered his position almost impregnable; and I never saw any statement, which tended in the slightest degree to invalidate their claim to general belief; and, certainly, there were not a few individuals who, previous to Sir Arthur's landing, entertained very alarming apprehensions as to the result of the attack, if such had been found unavoidable. You then ask, "Was Junot's army to be fed by ravens?" I cannot immediately find the passage, but something to this effect. If you were as successful in proving that Junot was not supplied with, nor had any means of procuring provisions for his army, as you are in exposing the hollow and groundless reasons entertained by our generals as to the impracticability of obtaining a supply for the English army, I should determine not to trouble you with these observations, although the question, as it respects the public, would still remain the same. The newspapers, however, furnished us with various accounts of Junot's having collected a large quantity of provisions; and there was no great reason to believe, that a French army would starve while there were between 2 and 300,000 *Portuguese* inhabitants in Lisbon, people whom we went to assist, not to distress, to defend, and not to assail. This was a most perplexing situation for our army, and Junot would take especial care to increase the difficulty to his utmost. Now, had the beforementioned statements of the immense strength of Junot's position, and his abundant supply of provisions been disproved instead of meeting with a confirmation, in the unqualified assertion, "that Junot could easily have consumed time in a protracted defence," it would avail nothing to your argument. And unless you convince us that every individual of the public, who naturally expected an unconditional surrender was, in forming such opinion, convinced that Junot had no formidable entrenchments to fly to, and no supply of provisions, it will not assist you, if you can even prove that Sir Arthur could have marched into Lisbon with no more obstruction than one of your readers into Mr. Bagshaw's shop, and would have been as cordially and politely welcomed. You proceed—"Well, then," say you, "if "it be true that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with "only 9000 men, beat the whole of the "French force, in spite of all their advan-"tages, have we not a right to expect, nay, "had we not a right to claim and to de-"mand, at the hands of the commander in "Portugal, when he had 30,000 men, the "capture or the total destruction of the "French army in Portugal, and if any na-"tion had any right to expect any thing, "this nation had a right to expect a result "such as here described?"—It is true policy in a general to whom the defence of a strong place is entrusted, and who has at his disposal a force more than necessary for its defence, to march out and attack the army advancing to the siege, if the circumstances, under which he is to make the attack, are such as to justify him in expecting a favourable result; and in the event of his sustaining a repulse, retreat to his position is secure. On the contrary, it would evince a great want of skill in the general, who would march out when his force was scarcely sufficient to garrison the place, where success was not certain. Junot, in his plan of attack on the 21st, and in his resistance at Roleia, appears to have been perfectly satisfied that he should succeed. It fortunately was not the case, but his retreat was not prevented. What was the effect? The English army was enabled to blockade him, and prevent his incursions into the country; he could not again meet them in the field; but it did not follow that an English army would be able to expel him from his forts. A crowd of instances might be collected to prove, that men who had been beaten in

the field, had successfully defended a fortified place; but those of more recent occurrence, will perhaps be more convincing. We have not yet ceased to deplore the fate and admire the courage of the Spaniards, defeated at Rio Seco, and our tongues still vibrate with the praises of the undisciplined defenders of Valencia, Gerona, and Saragossa; places certainly not more formidable than the forts and entrenchments of Portugal. Now, I do not mean to insinuate that our troops could not reduce Junot; but their amounting to 30,000 would not prevent less bloodshed. Do you believe, that if Lisle, Maestricht, or Brissac, were properly garrisoned and commanded, that the besieging army would experience less loss, if they were ten times the number of the blockaded garrison? We also know, that in the battle of the 17th, when our army forced the passes of Roleia, only 6000 men could be brought to bear; and it is probable, that if Loison and Laborde had effected their junction before the attack was made, we should have experienced a very alarming loss. I think no one will deny, that the public had the means of satisfactorily ascertaining that Junot effected his retreat after the battle of the 21st; that the places to which he retired were strong by nature and art; that he had a plentiful supply of provisions, and that his force after his defeat was still formidable; and the probability of reducing him not much greater than when the forces first sailed, recollecting, that at that time it was generally reported and believed, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would land at Peniche, and immediately invest the place. Impressed with the belief of these facts, I really cannot see how the public could anticipate the result, such as they did anticipate, and as you have related, till the public will declare that conditions might not be granted which would be preferable to the certainty of great loss in the attack of these places, and the chance of failure; till it can be proved that it was the public conviction, that our army would have been able to continue the blockade without much difficulty, that their services were not wanted in any other quarter; till, in short, it can be proved, that the public was certain that there were no secret motives, and those very strong ones, to influence the determination of our commanders to agree to a conditional surrender. So far, I think, you will allow unconditional surrender could not reasonably be expected by the public, and that our commanders were, so far, prematurely disgraced; but I most perfectly concur with the now general opinion, that except in the most distressing circumstances, nothing can justify our commanders for having acceded to the present Convention; it is, I fear, a Convention which has affixed to the British army and nation a stigma so indelible, that no event, however favourable, can wholly remove it, or prevent its suggesting the most agonizing reflections. We are, however, well aware, that great public calamities and individual misfortunes, have not unfrequently given rise to, or been accompanied by circumstances which, in the progress of time, have very materially contributed to diminish the pernicious effects apprehended at their occurrence; and it is some consolation, that the people have not suffered their reputation to be sullied without a murmur; that the same page of history which records this infamous and insulting Convention, will also relate the virtuous indignation felt by a people jealous of their honour; will rouse the lethargic, and animate the torpid of succeeding ages, by a glowing description of the patriotism which prevailed in every rank; will detail the people's vehement and unceasing cries for vengeance on those who dared to degrade their character, and debase their dignity. And although it is highly probable, that the immediate consequences of this Convention will be highly disastrous, it is not impossible that it may produce some beneficial effects. It will shew the world the feelings and character of Englishmen; it will powerfully instruct our military commanders, that the honour of a nation is not to be surrendered with impunity. Since the commencement of the French revolution, no treachery however base, no infamy however atrocious (and unfortunately many equally, nay, more iniquitous than the Convention of Lisbon may be enumerated), ever produced in the countries where they happened complaints so general and unqualified as in the present instance. The consideration of these circumstances will afford more than a transient gleam amidst the immense gloom; will prove more serviceable than a solitary spar, when threatening waves surround. I feel confident that I have been considerably too prolix and tedious, that many of my remarks are totally unnecessary, and others not sufficiently elucidated; but as I have not time to condense and arrange them, I shall leave them to your candid and unprejudiced consideration. I cannot, however, conclude without expressing my regret, that any circumstances should exist which could prevent our having, what we certainly very much wanted, and which you have energe-

tically expressed, "an instance of triumph, "a proof of victory, which no one could "gainsay."——I have the honour to remain, Sir, &c.——C.

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

SIR;—The Edinburgh Reviewers, in their bulky pamphlet of April, 1808, under the guise of reviewing two publications, written by gentlemen, whose names, I believe, are wholly unknown to the public, a Mr. Rylance and a Mr. Lingham, are pleased to enlighten the world with their thoughts, upon the subject of the late emigration to the Brazils. Upon this topic, I feel no interest in controverting their opinions, as they are of course the echo of the speeches in parliament, of that faction upon whose fortunes their own depend; it being now no secret to any one that the positive overbearing and dogmatical paradoxes, which have so peculiarly distinguished the Edinburgh Review, proceed from a small knot of *young friends*, who hunt after the good dinners and other good things of those accomplished statesmen, Lords Holland and Henry Petty. The subject, upon which I at present address you, Mr. Cobbett, is the language, which, in the article above-mentioned, these gentlemen have made use of upon the subject of Libel; language betraying at once the base slavish spirit of which they are composed, and the determined hostility which animates them against all the assertors of the Liberty of the Press. It seems, that these authors, whose pamphlets form the pretence of the review, Mr. Rylance and Mr. Lingham, unfortunately agreed in nothing but in each dedicating his work to the Liverpool Solomon, Mr. Roscoe. Upon every point, relating to the subject of the Portuguese emigration, they differed in their sentiments. Mr. Lingham, to use the words of the review, "kept quite clear "of the least appearance of faction; while "Mr. Rylance, without any material qualification, except perhaps his praise of "Mr. Roscoe in the dedication, adopted "the precise line of argument, taken by "the persons in opposition to the present "ministry." This was difference enough to regulate the judgment of these candid, and impartial critics. Mr. Rylance became, of course, the favourite, and Mr. Lingham, as a man swayed by no party motions, but bold and independent enough to write from his own understanding, was, of course, to be run down. If, however, on the present occasion, the Edinburgh Reviewers had confined themselves to literary strictures only, however partial and corrupt those strictures might have been, I should not have called your attention to them. But will you believe it, Mr. Cobbett? in consequence of Mr. Lingham, who in his book, according to these critics' own account, "kept quite "clear of the least appearance of faction," having characterised the other gentleman by a few expressions not by any means unusual in political controversy, and none of which, from their analysis of his publication, I think it is pretty clear, were misapplied; such as "obscure pamphleteer," "unauthorized tool of a party," and the like; I say, will you, Sir, believe it, that these worthy disciples of the Whig school, these pains-taking underlings of the present Opposition, these Scotch preachers of political liberty, are actually for letting loose the dogs of *law* upon poor Mr. Lingham, and amercing him with fines, penalties, imprisonment, and the pillory, for having failed to acknowledge the eminent consequence of this Mr. Rylance and his perfect independence, (which, be it observed, these reviewers themselves impeach) for having dared to publish the truth of him, and to speak of him as he deserves. They introduce their whining complaint, and garbled quotations of Mr. Lingham's "abusive language" with this sentence: "Some passages, we are "pretty sure, would subject him to punish-"ment in a court of justice:" and having finished their extracts, they conclude:—"We have little doubt that the above pas-"sages, are themselves libellous." Is not this monstrous? Why, the action lately brought by the Duke of Bedford's Knight, (I forget his name) was nothing to this. Irritated feelings in being shewn to be a dunce, and disappointed expectations in not getting from his task-master his usual hire, to a certain degree palliated the resentment of that wretched book-maker. But what have these reviewers to urge in extenuation of this gratuitous recommendation of legal proceedings? Mr. Lingham did not charge *them* with a systematic and scandalous perversion of their duty, with a base and profligate bias either for or against every author whom they noticed; Mr. Lingham did not say of *them*, that their malignity against most authors was to be equalled only by their interested adulation of a few; that their wanton and scurrilous attacks on respectable writers in general, were balanced only in infamy by their gross and unblushing panegyrics upon the members of their own fraternity; that, throughout the whole of their career, their pens have been vilely prostituted to party purposes, in which task their inconsistency has been as notorious as their corruption,—

immediate possession of Tuscany.—The Favourite was to have for his portion the Algarves and Alantejo, in full property and sovereignty, but the emperor's answer to the letters of the royal father had not yet arrived; it was completely uncertain what it would be, and this filled him with fear and anxiety.—The intimate relations which the Favourite maintained at that period with the Grand Duke of Berg, through the medium of his confident Isquierdo, flattered him to a certain degree with the hope that every thing would be settled to his wishes, though th interposition of a few millions might be ne essary. But neither the Favourite nor his confident knew the real intentions of the person they were treating with at Paris. In fact, the instant the emperor found that the Favourite had committed himself, and the royal parents were brought into discredit, he shewed no disposition to answer his majesty's letters, for the purpose of keeping them in suspense, and inspiring them with dread, in the hope that they might form the resolution of withdrawing, though at that time he had not completed his plan for taking an advantage of such an occurrence.—The Grand Duke wrote to the Favourite, that he would employ every means to support him, but that the negociation was rendered very delicate, owing to the extraordinary attachment which prevailed in Spain towards the prince of Asturias, and the considera tion due towards a princess who was cousin to the Empress, and in consequence of the part the ambassador Beaubarnois, her relative, took in the business. (1).—Now it was that the Favourite began clearly to discover how much his credit had sunk, and he gave himself up for lost, in consequence of being deprived of the support of his imaginary protector, the Emperor of the French. There were no means now neglected by him to endeavour to ingratiate himself with the Grand Duke of Berg; every sort of expression, every kind of deference was employed for this purpose; and the more effectually to avert the impending storm, he prevailed on the royal parents to write to the emperor direct, and to request his consent to the marriage of one of his cousins to the prince of Asturias.—Meanwhile the Emperor of the French appeared to be very much dissatisfied with the conduct of Isquierdo, and kept him at a distance, in order to cut off this direct mode of communication, and to make himself more impenetrable.—His Imperial majesty set off on a journey to Italy, with that studied parade which all Europe has witnessed, giving it such an air of importance, that it was to be presumed he was going to fix the destinies of the world. But there is reason to surmise, that his real object was no other than to divert the general attention to that quarter, for the purpose of misleading the other states, whilst his real designs were directed to the invasion of Portugal and Spain.—This artifice and dissimulation did not, however, prevent the discovery of one of the articles in the Secret Treaty of Fontainbleau, by his expelling, with the greatest precipitation, from Tuscany, the Queen Regent and her children, and plundering the royal palace, and seizing all the public funds of a court that was ignorant of the existence of such a treaty, and had committed no act of forfeiture.—Whilst the emperor kept Europe in suspence by his journey to Milan and Venice, he thought fit to answer the letters, which he had some time before received from the royal father, assuring his majesty, that he never had the slightest information of the circumstances which he communicated respecting his son the prince of Asturias, nor ever received any letter from his royal highness. (2). Nevertheless his majesty consented to the proposed intermarriage with a princess of his family, undoubtedly with an intention of amusing the royal parents; whilst he was sending into Spain, under various pretexts, all the troops which he had then disposable, and was studiously propagating an idea that he was favourable to the cause of the prince of Asturias, and thus endeavouring to captivate the good opinion of the Spanish nation.—The royal parents, struck with terror which this conduct of the emperor naturally inspired, and the Favourite being still more astonished, opposed no obstacle to the entrance of the French troops into the peninsula; on the contrary, they gave the most effectual orders that they should be received and treated even on a better footing than the Spanish troops.—The emperor, under the pretence of consulting the security of these troops, ordered his generals, by stratagem or force to get possession of the fortresses of Pampeluna, St.

(1) All this appears from the correspondence of the Favourite with the Grand Duke, which the latter carried off from the office of the secretary of state, during his lieutenancy.

(2) Compare this statement, with the contents of the letter (No. 3), from his Imperial majesty to King Ferdinand, in which he acknowledges having received the letter written to him by the Prince of Asturias, on the suggestion of ambassador Beauharnois.

Sebastian, Figueras, and Barcelona, which alone could present any obstacle to an invasion. They were accordingly taken by fraud and surprize, to the indignation and sorrow of the whole nation, to which the French still affected to profess friendship and alliance.—The emperor, conceiving himself already master of all Spain, and thinking the time had arrived for accelerating his measures, thought proper to write a letter to the royal father, complaining in the bitterest terms, that his majesty had not renewed his application for an imperial princess for his son the prince of Asturias. The king was pleased to return for answer, that he adhered to his former proposal, and was willing that the marriage should immediately take place.—Some important proceeding was still necessary to carry the project to a degree of maturity, and the emperor not willing to trust it to writing, thought he could not find a better instrument than Don Eugenio Izquierdo, whom he had detained in Paris in a state of great dejection and terror, that had been artfully impressed upon him for the purpose of his more effectually executing his commission, by impressing the royal parents and the Favourite with the same feelings.—In this state of things, the emperor ordered Izquierdo to repair to Spain, which he accordingly did, in a very precipitate and mysterious manner. According to his verbal statements, he brought no proposal in writing with him, nor was he to receive any, and he had orders to remain only three days.—On his arrival, under these circumstances, at Aranjuez, the Favourite conducted him to the presence of the royal parents, and their conferences were conducted with so much secresy, that it was impossible for any one to discover the object of his mission; but soon after his departure from this capital, their majesties began to shew a disposition to abandon the metropolis and the peninsula, and to emigrate to Mexico.—The recent example of the determination taken by the royal family of Portugal, seemed to have fully corresponded with the views of the emperor, and there is reason to think that his imperial majesty promised himself a similar success in Spain.—But he must have been very ignorant of the Spanish character to flatter himself with such expectations. Scarcely had the first reports gone abroad of the intention of the royal family to abandon their residence, a resolution clearly indicated by the many preparations which were going on, when discontent and fear were depicted in the most lively colours in the features of all the inhabitants of the capital, and of all ranks and classes of persons. This alone was sufficient to induce their majesties to refute the rumour, and to assure the people that they would not abandon them.—Nevertheless, such was the general distrust, such the magnitude of the evils which must have resulted, and such and so many the symptoms of a determination to emigrate, that every one was on the alert, and all seemed to be impressed with the necessity of preventing a measure pregnant with so many mischiefs. The danger increased, and the fears of the public kept pace with it. The consequence was, that the commotions of Aranjuez, on the 17th and 19th of March, burst forth like a sudden explosion; the people being led by a sort of instinct of self-preservation. The result was, the imprisonment of the Favourite, who, without the title of king, had exercised all the functions of royalty.—Scarcely had this tempestuous scene taken place, when the royal parents, finding themselves deprived of the support of their Favourite, took the unexpected but voluntary resolution which they had for some time entertained to abdicate their throne, as they accordingly did, in favour of their son and heir the Prince of Asturias.—The emperor, ignorant of this sudden event, and perhaps never supposing that the Spaniards were capable of displaying such resolution, had ordered prince Murat to advance with his army towards Madrid, under the idea that the royal family were already on the coast, and on the point of embarking, and that far from meeting the slightest obstacle on the part of the people, all of them would receive him with open arms, as their deliverer and guardian angel. He conceived, that the nation was in the highest degree dissatisfied with their government, and never reflected that they were only dissatisfied with the abuses which had crept into the administration of it.—The instant the grand duke of Berg was apprised of the occurrences at Aranjuez, he advanced with his whole army to occupy the capital of the kingdom; intending, no doubt, to profit by the occasion, and to take such steps as should be best calculated to realize, by any means, the plan of making himself master of Spain.—In the meanwhile, the mysterious obscurity of the emperor's projects, the proximity of his troops, and the ignorance in which Ferdinand VII. was of the real object of the emperor's approach, induced the king to adopt such measures as appeared to his majesty best calculated to conciliate the good-will of the emperor. Not satisfied with having communicated his

accession to the throne in the most friendly and affectionate terms, the king appointed a deputation of three grandees of Spain to proceed to Bayonne, and in his name to compliment his imperial majesty. He also appointed another grandee of Spain to pay a similar compliment to the grand duke of Berg, who had already arrived in the vicinity of Madrid.—One of the contrivances which the French agent immediately had recourse to, was to assure the king, and to spread the rumour in all quarters, that his imperial majesty's arrival might be expected every moment. Under this impression, the necessary orders were given for preparing apartments in the palace suitable to the dignity of so august a guest; and the king wrote again to the emperor, how agreeable it would be to him to be personally acquainted with his majesty, and to assure him with his own lips, of his ardent wishes to strengthen more and more the alliance which subsisted between the two sovereigns.—The grand duke of Berg had in the meantime entered Madrid, at the head of his troops. He was no sooner acquainted with the state of affairs, than he began to sow discord. He spoke in a mysterious manner of the abdication of the crown, executed by the royal father in favour of his son, amidst the tumults of Aranjuez, and gave it to be understood, that until the emperor had acknowledged Ferd. VII. it was impossible for him to take any step that should appear like an acknowledgement, and that he must be under the necessity of treating only with the royal father.—This pretext did not fail to produce the effect which the grand duke intended. The royal parents, the moment they were informed of this circumstance, availed themselves of it to save the Favourite, who remained in confinement, and in whose favour prince Murat professed to take an interest, for the sole purpose of flattering their majesties, mortifying Ferd. VII. and sowing fresh matter of discord between the parents and the son.—In this state of things, the new king made his public entry into Madrid, without any other parade than the most numerous concourse of all the inhabitants of the capital and its environs, the strongest expressions of love and loyalty, and the applauses and acclamations which sprung from the joy and enthusiasm of his subjects—a scene truly grand and impressive, in which the young king was seen like a father in the midst of his children, entering his capital as the regenerator and guardian angel of the monarchy.—The duke of Berg was an eye-witness of this scene; but far from abandoning his plan, he resolved to persist in it with greater ardour. The experiment upon the royal parents produced the desired effect; but whilst the beloved king, who came to the throne under such good auspices, continued to be present, it was impossible to carry the plan into execution. It was, therefore, necessary to make every effort to remove Ferdinand VII. from Madrid.—To accomplish this purpose, the grand duke every moment spread reports of the arrival of a fresh courier, with accounts of the emperor's departure from Paris, and that he might be speedily expected to arrive in this capital. He directed his efforts in the first instance to induce the infant Don Carlos to set off to receive his imperial majesty, upon the supposition that his highness must meet him before he had proceeded two days upon his journey. His majesty acceded to the proposal, being influenced by the purest and most beneficent intentions. He had no sooner succeeded in procuring the departure of the Infant, than he manifested the most anxious desire that the King should do the same, leaving no means untried to persuade his majesty to take this step, and assuring him that it would be attended by the most happy consequences to the king and the whole kingdom.—At the same time that the grand duke of Berg, the ambassador, and all the other agents of France, were proceeding in this course, they were, on the other side, busily employed with the royal parents to procure from them a formal protest against the abdication of the crown, which they had executed spontaneously and with the accustomed solemnities, in favour of their son and legitimate heir.—His majesty being incessantly urged to go to meet the emperor, painfully hesitated between the necessity of performing an act of courtesy to his ally, which he was assured would be attended with such advantageous results, and his reluctance to abandon his loyal and beloved people under such critical circumstances.—In this embarrassing situation, I can assert, that my constant opinion, as the king's minister, was, that his majesty should not leave his capital until he received certain information that the emperor was already arrived in Spain, and was approaching Madrid; and that even then, he should only proceed to a distance so short as not to render it necessary to sleep one night out of his capital. —His majesty for some days persisted in the resolution of not quitting Madrid until he received certain advice of the emperor's approach; and he would have probably continued in that determination, had not the arrival of general Savary added greater weight to the reiterated solicitations of the grand

duke, and the ambassador Beauharnois.—General Savary was announced as envoy from the emperor, and in that capacity demanded an audience from his majesty, which was immediately granted. At this audience he professed that he was sent by the emperor merely to compliment his majesty, and to know whether his sentiments with respect to France were conformable to those of the king his father, in which case the emperor would forego all consideration of what had passed, would in no degree interfere in the internal concerns of the kingdom, and would immediately recognize his majesty as king of Spain and the Indies.—The most satisfactory answer was given to general Savary, and the conversation was continued in terms so flattering, that nothing more could have been desired. The audience terminated with an assurance upon his part, that the emperor had already left Paris, that he was near Bayonne, and on his way to Madrid.—Scarcely had he left the audience chamber, when he began to make the most urgent applications, to induce his majesty to meet the emperor, assuring him that this attention would be very grateful and flattering to his imperial majesty; and he asserted so repeatedly, and in such positive terms, that the emperor's arrival might be expected every moment, that it was impossible not to give credit to his assertions. It was in fact very hard to suspect that a general, the envoy of an emperor, should have come merely for the purpose of deception.—The king at length yielded to so many solicitations, and so many flattering hopes and assurances; and his love of his subjects, and ardent desire to contribute to their happiness, by putting an end to this dreadful crisis, triumphed in his generous heart over every feeling of repugnance and apprehension.—The day appointed for his majesty's departure arrived. General Savary, affecting the most zealous and assiduous attention to his majesty, solicited the honour of accompanying him on his journey, which, at the farthest, could only extend to Burgos, according to the information which he had just received of the emperor's approach.—During his absence, supposed to be only for a few days, the king left at Madrid a supreme junta of government, consisting of the secretaries of state, and presided over by his uncle, the most serene infant Don Antonio, in order that the urgent affairs of the government should be attended to.—General Savary followed him to Burgos, in a separate carriage; but the emperor not having arrived there, he used every exertion to induce his majesty to continue his journey as far as Vittoria. Various discussions arose as to the course which ought to be pursued; but artifice and perfidy contended with honour, innocence, and good faith; and, in so unequal a strife, the same benevolent intentions which drew his majesty from his capital urged him to proceed to Vittoria.—General Savary, convinced that his majesty had resolved to proceed no farther, continued his journey to Bayonne with the intention undoubtedly of acquainting the emperor of all that had passed, and of procuring a letter from him which should determine the king to separate himself from his people.—At Vittoria his majesty received information that the emperor arrived at Bourdeaux, and was on his way to Bayonne. In consequence of this advice, the infant Don Carlos, who had been waiting at Tolosa, proceeded on to Bayonne, whither he had been invited by the emperor, who, however, delayed his arrival some days longer.—Nothing particular occurred at Vittoria, except that the supreme junta of government at Madrid, having written that the Grand Duke of Berg had imperiously demanded that the Favourite should be released and placed in his hands, his majesty did not think proper to comply with this demand; and in communicating this determination to the junta of government, enjoined them to enter into no explanation with the grand duke respecting the fate of the prisoner (3).—In the meantime, general Savary concerted with the emperor in what manner they should prepare to give the finishing blow; and while the French troops in the vicinity of Vittoria were making suspicious movements, he made his appearance in that city, with the letter No. 3, to his majesty from the emperor.—To the contents of this letter, which were neither flattering nor decorous, general Savary added so many and such vehement protestations of the interest which the emperor took in the welfare of his majesty, and of

(3) Every body knows that the prisoner was at length delivered up to the French and conducted under an escort by them to Bayonne. This step was solely owing to an order from the junta of government yielding to imperious circumstances and the peremptory menaces of the grand duke, as is stated more at large in the appendix to this publication.

Spain, that he even went so far as to say: 'I will suffer my head to be cut off, if, 'within a quarter of an hour of your majesty's arrival at Bayonne, the emperor 'shall not have recognized you as king of 'Spain and the Indies. To support his own 'consistency, he will probably begin by 'giving you the title of highness, but in five 'minutes he will give you that of majesty, 'and in three days every thing will be settled, and your majesty may return to 'Spain immediately.'—His majesty, however, hesitated as to the course which he should take; but anxious to redeem the pledge which he had given, and, above all, to relieve his beloved subjects from the cruel anxiety in which they were, he banished from his heart every apprehension of danger, and shut his ears against my counsels, and those of other persons in his train, as well as to the supplications of that loyal city, and determined to proceed to Bayonne; his royal mind being incapable of suspecting that a sovereign, his ally, should invite him as a guest, for the purpose of making him a prisoner, and of putting an end to a dynasty, which, so far from having offended him, had given him so many striking proofs of its friendship.—Scarcely had his majesty set foot on the French territory, when he remarked that no one came to receive him, until, at his arrival at St Jean de Luz, the mayor made his appearance, attended by the municipality. The carriage stopped, and he addressed his majesty with the most lively expressions of the joy he felt at having the honour of being the first to receive a king, who was the friend and ally of France.—Shortly after, he was met by the deputation of the three Grandees of Spain, who had been sent off to meet the emperor; and their representation, with respect to the intentions of the emperor, was not the most flattering. He was, however, now too near Bayonne to think of changing his course, and he therefore continued his journey.—There came out to meet the king the prince of Neufchatel and Duroc, marshal of the palace, with a detachment of the guard of honour which the citizens of Bayonne had formed to attend the emperor, and they invited his majesty to enter Bayonne, where a place had been prepared for his residence. This residence appeared to all, and was in reality, but little suitable to the rank of the august guest who was to occupy it. This remarkable and expressive neglect formed a singular contrast with the studied magnificence which the king had employed in making the preparations at Madrid for the reception of his ally.—His majesty was doubting what could be the meaning of a reception that he so little expected, when he was informed that the emperor was coming to pay him a visit. His imperial majesty arrived, accompanied by a number of his generals. The king went down to the street-door to receive him, and both monarchs embraced each other with every token of friendship and affection. The emperor staid but a short time with his majesty, and they embraced each other again at parting.—Soon after marshal Duroc came to invite the king to dine with his imperial majesty, whose carriages were coming to convey his majesty to the palace of Marac: this accordingly took place. The emperor came as far as the coach-steps to receive his majesty, embraced him again, and led him by the hand to the apartment provided for him.—The king had no sooner returned to his residence, when Gen. Savary waited on his majesty to inform him that the emperor had irrevocably determined that the Bourbon dynasty should no longer reign in Spain; that it should be succeeded by his; and therefore his imperial majesty required that the king should, in his own name and that of all his family, renounce the crown of Spain and the Indies, in favour of the dynasty of Buonaparte.—It would be difficult to describe the surprize with which the royal mind of his majesty was affected, and the consternation with which all those who were nearest to his person were struck at hearing of such a proposition. his majesty was not yet recovered from the fatigues of a toilsome journey, when the same man who had made him so many protestations of security at Madrid and on the road, who had drawn him from his capital and his kingdom to Bayonne, on pretence of adjusting matters of the greatest importance to both states, and of his being recognised by his imperial majesty, had the audacity to be the bearer of so scandalous a proposal.—On the following day, I was sent for by the emperor to his royal palace, where I found the minister of foreign affairs, M. Champagny, waiting to enter upon a discussion of the proposals verbally stated by general Savary. I instantly complained of the perfidy with which so important an affair was proceeded in; representing that the king, my master, came to Bayonne, relying on the assurances given by general Savary, in the name of the emperor, and in the presence of the dukes del Infantado, S. Carlos, D. Juan Escoiquiz, and myself, that his imperial majesty would recognize him at the very first interview between the two sovereigns in the imperial palace of Marac; that when his majesty expected to witness the

realization of this promised recognition, he was surprised with the propositions above alluded to; and that his majesty had authorised me to protest against the violence done to his person, in not permitting him to return to Spain; and as a categorical and final answer to the solicitation of the emperor, that the king neither would nor could renounce his crown in favour of another dynasty, without being wanting in the duties which he owed to his subjects and to his own character; that he could not do so in prejudice to the individuals of his own family, who were called to the succession by the fundamental laws of the kingdom; and much less could he consent to the establishment of another dynasty, which ought alone to be called to the throne by the Spanish nation, in virtue of their original right to elect another family upon the termination of the present dynasty.—The minister of foreign affairs insisted on the necessity of the renunciation which had been proposed, and contended that the abdication signed by Ch. IV, on the 19th of March, had not been voluntary.—I expressed my surprise that the king should be imporuned to renounce his crown, at the same moment that it was asserted that the renunciation of his father was not his free act. I wished however not to be understood as entering into such a discussion, as I could not acknowledge the smallest authority in the emperor to intermeddle with matters which were purely domestic, and peculiarly belonging to the Spanish government; following in this respect the example of the cabinet of Paris, when it rejected as inadmissible the applications of his majesty, the royal father, in favour of his ally and first cousin the unfortunate Louis XVI.—Nevertheless, desirous of giving to truth and innocence a testimony which they alone had a right to exact, I added, that three weeks before the disturbance at Aranjuez, Ch. IV. in my presence, and that of all the other ministers of state, addressed her majesty the queen, in these words: "Maria Louisa, we will retire to one of the provinces, where we will pass our days in tranquillity; and Ferdinand, who is a young man, will take upon himself the burden of the government."—I represented to him, that, on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, no violence was done to his majesty, in order to extort an abdication of his crown, either by the people who had risen purely from the apprehension that his majesty was going to remove to Seville, and thence to America; or on the part of his son, the prince of Asturias, or by other persons; of which facts the ministers of the *corps diplomatique*, as well as all the persons about the court, were fully convinced, since all of them congratulated and complimented the new sovereign, with the exception of the French ambassador, who pretended that he had not been furnished with the necessary instructions, disregarding the example of his colleagues, who were as little provided with instructions from their respective courts.—I concluded with proving to him that the renunciation of the royal father was only the consequence of his majesty's predilection for the tranquillity of a private life, and his persuasion that his constitution, enfeebled by age and habitual indisposition, was incompetent to support the heavy burden of the government.—This irrelevant objection having been got rid of, Mr. Champagny stated, that the emperor could never be sure of Spain, in case of a new war with the powers of the north, while the Spanish nation continued to be governed by a dynasty, who must regret to see its elder branch expelled from the monarchy of France.—I answered, that in a regular system of things, such prepossessions never prevailed over the interests of states, and that the political conduct of Ch. IV. since the treaty of Basle, afforded a recent proof that sovereigns paid little regard to family interests, when they were in opposition to the interests of their dominions; that the friendship between Spain and France was founded in local and political considerations; that the topographical situation of the two kingdoms was of itself sufficient to demonstrate how important it was for Spain to preserve a good understanding with France, the only state on the continent of Europe with which she had direct and very extensive relations, and consequently that every reason of policy induced Spain to maintain a perpetual peace with France. Besides, what ground of suspicion had the emperor with respect to a nation, who, to considerations of interest, add the inflexible and religious integrity with which at all periods, according to the admission of French writers themselves, they had preserved their federative system?—I added, that there were reasons no less important why France should not endanger the continuance of that harmony which prevailed since the treaty of Basle, with equal advantage to herself and to Spain; that the Spanish nation, whose generosity and affection for their sovereigns were proverbial, if from a principle of fidelity they had submitted to the caprices of despotism, when covered with the veil of majesty, would, from the operation of the same principle, display their well-known

valour, when they saw their independence, and the security of their beloved sovereign, violated; that if unfortunately France should commit so atrocious an insult, that power would lose an ally whose armies, fleet, and treasure, had in a great measure contributed to her triumphs; that England, which had in vain attempted to shake the good faith of the Spanish cabinet, for the purpose of separating her from France, would avail herself of such a conjuncture to diminish the force of her enemy, and to augment her own, by pacific relations with a power which she would assist with money and with her forces by land and sea, in the glorious enterprise of defending our independence, and the security of our king and natural lord; that the feeble colonies of France would not in that event find the maritime forces of Spain employed in obstructing the plans of conquest entertained by Great Britain; and that the commerce of that power must inevitably come into competition at the Spanish market with the French merchandize, which is now peculiarly favoured.—Besides these considerations, having a direct relation to the interests of both states, I expatiated on others no less cogent, and connected with the character of the French cabinet.—I reminded the minister, that, on the 27th Oct. last, a treaty was signed at Fontainbleau, wherein the emperor guarranteed the independence and integrity of the Spanish monarchy as it then was; that nothing had since occurred which could justify its infraction: on the contrary, that Spain had continued to add new claims to the confidence and gratitude of the French empire, as his imperial majesty himself had confessed, by the praises which he bestowed on the good faith and constant friendship of his intimate and first ally. What confidence, I added, can Europe place in her treaties with France, when she looks to the perfidy with which that of the 27th of Oct. has been violated? And what must be her terror when she sees the captious means, the seductive artifices, and the false promises, by which his imperial majesty has confined the king in the city of Bayonne, in order to espoil him of the crown to which, with e inexpressible joy of his people, he has en called by the fundamental laws of the gdom, and the spontaneous abdication of august father. Posterity will not believe the emperor could have given so great a to his own reputation, the loss of will leave no other means of con- g a war with him, than that of total tion and extermination.—This was of the discussion, when the emperor, who had overheard our conference ordered us to enter his own cabinet, where, to my great surprise, I was insulted by his imperial majesty with the infamous appellation of traitor, upon no other ground, than that, having been minister to Ch. IV, I continued to serve his son Ferd. VII. He also accused me, in an angry tone, of having maintained, in an official conference with General Monton, that my master, in order to his being king of Spain, did not stand in need of the recognition of the emperor, although that might be necessary, in order to continue his relations with the French government.—His imperial majesty manifested still greater irritation on account of my having said to a foreign minister, accredited to the court of Spain, that if the French army offered any violation to the integrity and independence of the Spanish sovereignty, 300,000 men would convince them that a brave and generous nation was not to be insulted with impunity.—After this ill treatment which I met with, which was as satisfactory to my own feelings, on account of the real causes of it, as it was painful on account of the royal personage whose interests were in question, his imperial majesty, with his natural asperity, entered into a conversation upon the points which had already been discussed. He was not insensible to the strength of my reasons and the solidity of the arguments by which I supported the rights of the king, his dynasty, and the whole nation; but his majesty concluded by telling me, "*I have* "*a system of policy of my own. You ought* "*to adopt more liberal ideas; to be less* "*susceptible on the point of honour, and* "*not sacrifice the prosperity of Spain to the* "*interest of the Bourbon family.*"—His majesty, distrusting the apparent complacency with which I received the attentions which he was pleased to shew me, as I was taking leave of him, sent to inform the king that upon the subject under discussion a more flexible negociator would be necessary. While his majesty was considering whom he should appoint to succeed me in this negotiation one of the many puppets who played their parts in this intrigue, introduced himself to the Archdeacon D. Juan de Escoiquiz, and persuaded him to pay a visit to the minister Champagny. He accordingly went, under the impulse of a most zealous regard for the interests of his majesty, and prevailed on the minister of the foreign affairs, to communicate to him the most secret propositions of the emperor, which the said Seignor Escoiquiz immediately put in writing, and a literal copy of [illegible]

found in No. 4, of the annexed documents.—In this state of things, his majesty, impressed with the qualities which adorn the most excellent Seignor, Don Pedro de Labrador, formerly minister to the court of Florence, and honorary councillor of state, invested him with full powers and suitable instructions, which may be seen in No. 4, ordering him to present them to the minister of foreign affairs, and to demand his full powers in return, and that the proposals of his imperial majesty should be communicated in an anthentic manner. Both those demands were rejected by the minister Champagny, under the frivolous pretext that '*they were matters of form, being wholly* '*unconnected with the essential object of the* '*negociation.*'—Seignor Labrador insisted on the importance of both the one and the other requisites, especially in a matter of such great consequence, adding that without them he could discuss no subject, and that the king his master required them to vary the instructions, if necessary, that had been given him; but always in vain. Notwithstanding this, Seignor Champagny talked of the last propositions of the emperor, which were somewhat different from those presented by general Savary, but not less irritating and violent; and he concluded with telling Seignor Labrador that the prosperity of Spain and his own were at that moment within his power.—This minister answered that he would communicate to the king his master these new proposals. He made those reflections upon them which his talents, his zeal for the service of his sovereign, and for the good of his country, naturally suggested; and he stated that the welfare of his sovereign, and that of the nation, were inseparably united. He added, that to these two objects he had directed all his attention in various situations; and, lastly, he said that he readily admitted that his own prosperity depended on the issue, because his fidelity to the king of Spain, and to his native country, as well as the reputation he had acquired by the faithful discharge of his duty, were connected with it. Seignor Labrador, before he terminated the conversations asked M. Champagny if the king was in a state of liberty? To which the French minister replied that there could be no doubt of it. On this, Labrador rejoined, 'then he should be restored to his kingdom.' To this the Frenchman replied, 'that, in 'respect to his return to Spain, it was ne-'cessary that his majesty should have a right 'understanding with his imperial majesty, 'either personally or by letter.'—This answer, added to the other circumstances, left, no doubt in the mind of the king, that he was actually at Bayonne in a state of arrest; however, to give more ostensibility to this violence extended towards his majesty, I sent a note (No. 5) by his royal order, to the minister for foreign affairs, telling him that the king was determined to return to Madrid, to tranquillize the agitation of his beloved subjects, and to provide for the transaction of the important business of his kingdom; assuring M. Champagny at the same time, that I would continue to treat with his imperial majesty, on affairs reciprocally advantageous. No answer was given to this communication, nor had it any other effect than to increase the caution and vigilance before applied for the detention of his majesty.—Senor Labrador was certainly not a fit person for their purposes, for he was immediately got rid of under the pretence of his not holding a rank corresponding to that of Monsieur Champagny, and that his natural disposition was too inflexible.—The tricks of diplomacy could not prevail over the firmness of the king, or the zeal of his representatives, and the individuals of his royal household, who deliberated at a council (his majesty being present) upon the interests of the king and the nation; so that the emperor saw himself under the necessity of changing his plan, in order to accomplish his purpose, and he wished that the royal parents should depart for Bayonne, in order to make them the instruments of the oppression and disgrace of their son. For this purpose he ordered the Grand Duke of Berg to employ all his arts to accelerate their journey to Bayonne.—The royal parents required, that the Favourite should precede them in their journey, and the grand duke made various applications to the junta of government to obtain his liberty. The junta had no authority to liberate him, having in this point been laid under positive restraint by his majesty's orders from Vittoria, as has been already mentioned; but the council misled by the suggestions of his imperial majesty, and intimidated by the threat that the grand duke would obtain by irresistible force what would not be conceded as a favour, the junta ordered the release of Don Manuel Godoi, who was immediately conveyed to Bayonne, under an adequate escort. The decree No. 6, in the hand-writing of the king, is an authentic proof of the determination of his majesty as to this particular.——The royal parents undertook their journey, and proceeded in it with too much rapidity for the unhappy state of health of Ch. IV.; but the inexorable will of the emperor had

determined that it should be so.—What his imperial majesty undertook was a most arduous task. It was necessary to his purposes to deaden the sensibility of the king; to destroy his affection for his first-born, which the most infamous court intrigue ever contrived had not yet wholly extinguished. Further, it was necessary, that these loving parents, affectionate to some of their children, should, with respect to him, substitute for their natural tenderness the most frigid and cruel indifference. To fulfil the purposes intended by Napoleon, in the end, with respect to the royal parents, they must become the instruments of misery, correction, and imprisonment; they were to become the jailors of their children. His power, by triumphing over all the feelings of nature, accomplished his purposes.—I have proved that the abdication of the royal father at Aranjuez was a spontaneous act, and that the motive to it was the partiality of his majesty towards his disgraced Favourite. In Bayonne, he told the king, his son, that he did not wish to return to the throne of Spain; notwithstanding that, he desired his majesty should renounce the crown, to make a present of it to the emperor; that is, to present it to a sovereign, who, in part at least, has been the origin of the difficulties of Spain, the only cause of the loss of our squadrons, the mover of the disturbances at court, and in the nation, and of the intended journey of the royal family to Seville, and from thence to America, prevented by the explosion of the 17th of March.—I leave to the wisdom of the sovereigns of Europe to judge whether it be possible that a monarch, affectionate to his children, highly enlightened, penetrated deeply by the principles of religion, and pious without superstition, could without violence forget for a moment all his duties to his family, and proscribe his whole dynasty, to call another to the throne, for whom he has no esteem, and, on the contrary, detests, as the plunderer of those thrones which have come within the reach of his ambition. If such be the change, it is the most extraordinary revolution that history has presented to the world.—Ferdinand VII. over-awed, a prisoner, and controuled by circumstances, on the 1st of May made a conditional renunciation of his crown, in favour of his august father. (No. 7). To this followed the letter of the royal father to his son (No. 8), and the very discreet answer of the royal son to the father, (No. 9).—On the 5th of the same month of May, at four in the afternoon, the emperor went to visit the royal parents, and continued in conference until five o'clock, when king Ferdinand was called in by his august father to hear, in the presence of the queen and the emperor, expressions so disgusting and humiliating, that I do not dare to record them. All the party were seated except king Ferdinand, whom the father ordered to make an absolute renunciation of the crown, under pain of being treated, with all his household, as an usurper of the throne, and a conspirator against the life of his parents.—His majesty would have preferred death; but desirous not to involve in his misfortunes the number of persons compriz-ed in the threat of Ch. IV. he assented to another renunciation, (No. 10), which bears on its front all the indications of constraint and violence, and which in no respect answers its purpose, to colour over the intended usurpation of the emperor.—These are the only instances of renunciation in which I have interfered as minister and secretary of state. That which is spoken of at Bourdeaux, I have not the least knowledge of; but I know the emperor, in the last conference with king Ferdinand VII. said to his majesty, "*Prince, il faut opter entre "la cession et la mort.*"—"*Prince you "have only to choose between cession and "death.*"—With respect to the rest, the whole world is apprized that Ch. IV. renounced the crown to the emperor at the time that the prince of Asturias, his brother the infant Don Carlos, and his uncle the infant Don Antonio, were forced to surrender their rights. The emperor, now believing himself proprietor of the crown of Spain, placed it on the head of his brother Joseph Napoleon, king of Naples.—It has already been explained, that although the king left his court for a few days, he thought fit to sanction a junta, of which the infant Don Antonio was to be president, with full powers to determine for him and in his royal name, all subjects that would not admit of delay. Every night I sent a courier to this junta, communicating what appeared necessary for its information and direction.—When the king arrived at Bayonne (and on the day of his arrival, the ambitious and violent intentions of the emperor were communicated to him) I began to fear that the extraordinary couriers would be intercepted, as was found to be the fact. Among the various disputes that I had with the minister, Champagny, on the different accidents that occasioned the detention of the cabinet couriers, the answer that he gave me to a remonstrance of mine is sufficiently remarkable. It is to be seen among the documents in justification. (No. 11.) In this situation of things, I took the precaution of

sending duplicates by different conveyances. By such means, I succeeded so far as to give information to the junta of government of the arrest and oppression to which the king had been exposed.—— It was easy to foresee that the freedom of the junta would not be respected, since, notwithstanding all the offers and assurances of the emperor, the liberty of the sovereign was violated at Bayonne; and that the noble designs of some members of the same assembly would be obstructed (although boldly declared) by the irresistible power of the representative of the emperor. To this, no doubt, is to be attributed their not having consulted upon the awful condition of the kingdom, and the remedy for such a calamity, as well as not having appointed a junta to assume the regency, in a place where the bayonets of the enemy could not penetrate. —The king was surprized that the junta had not written; and by the following post, when his majesty had come to a determination in consequence, without losing a moment, I sent a royal order to the junta, that they should execute whatever was expedient for the service of the king and the kingdom, and that for that purpose they should employ all the powers which his majesty would possess if he were himself resident in the kingdom. (6)—Nothing could be written that could be more intelligible. The security of the means of communication diminished every moment; for I could not expect that the emperor would regard the sacredness of a correspondence, since he paid no respect to the person of the sovereign to whom it was subservient.—The junta, notwithstanding, thought it was necessary to consult his majesty, and to obtain his orders as to various measures which appeared to them necessary for the salvation of the country; and for this purpose they sent to Bayonne a confidential person of known zeal in the royal service, to transmit verbally to the king the following propositions:—" 1. Whether his majesty thought fit to authorise the junta to substitute, in case of need, some person or persons of their own body, or otherwise, to hold a council in a secure situation, where it could freely act; and they intreated his majesty to signify who should compose the council for that purpose, should he think the measure expedient. 2. Whether it was the wish of his majesty that hostilities should be commenced against the French army; and in that case, when and how the purpose should be executed. 3. Whether it were likewise the wish of the king that we should endeavour to prevent the entrance of more French troops into Spain, by guarding the passes on the frontiers. 4. Whether his majesty thought it would be right to convoke the cortes, for which purpose a decree of his majesty would be necessary, addressed to the royal council."—It being possible that at the arrival of the answer of the king, the junta would not be at liberty to act, they asked whether any chancery or audience of the kingdom should be empowered, which was not within the reach of the French troops. Further, if the cortes should be assembled, on what subjects of discussion it should proceed.—The person charged with these propositions, arrived at Bayonne on the 4th of May, at night; he came to me immediately, and having disclosed to me his business, I introduced him to his majesty without losing a moment.—The king having taken into consideration the four propositions submitted to his attention by the junta, sent in answer two royal decrees in the morning of the following day, the one written by his majesty with his own hand directed to the junta of government; the other signed by his majesty (" Yo el " Rey ") addressed in the first instance to the council, and next to any chancery or audience of the kingdom which should not be under restraint.—These original decrees dispatched by me with all care, and under secure conduct, it is well known, arrived in the hands of one of the members of the junta, who is now absent, and whose name was first mentioned; but the junta is apprized that he made no use of it, nor did he ever send to the council the decree which was addressed to it. (7)—The minutes of these two decrees are not in my possession, because the critical situation of the king at

(6) The cabinet courier conveying this royal order was intercepted, on which account I sent a duplicate, which was received by the junta, the memorandum of which I have not been able to preserve.

(7) When these two royal decrees came to the hands of the junta, the grand duke of Berg had been for some days president; and the affair of the 2d of May had taken place. The emperor after the departure of the royal parents, precipitately and indecently forced from the capital all the members of the royal family, and sent them to Bayonne. But yet he had to take the important step of taking complete possession of the government, in order to which the bloody scene of the 2d of May was exhibited, a scene of horror and iniquity, similar to what the modern French have executed in other countries with similar designs.

Bayonne, and the necessity of avoiding the exposition of his views, obliged me to destroy them. Notwithstanding this, I preserved them in my memory, and they are testified and certified by the three secretaries of his majesty, D. Eusebio Dardaxi y Azara, D. Luis de Onio, and D. Evaristo Perez de Castro, who were with me at Bayonne, and saw and read the two original decrees, the substance of which is as follows:—The king said to the junta of government that he was not in a state of freedom, and consequently incapable of taking any measures for the preservation of the royal person and the monarchy. On that account the junta was entrusted with most ample powers to repair to any place that should be deemed most convenient; that in the name of his majesty, and representing his own person, they might exercise all the functions of sovereignty; that hostilities should commence the moment when his majesty should proceed to the interior of France, which he would not do, unless obliged by violence. Lastly, that in such a case, the junta should prevent, in the best manner they could, the introduction of more troops into the Peninsula (8).—In the decree directed to the royal council, and next to any chancery or audience, his majesty said, that, in the situation in which he found himself, deprived of his liberty, it was his royal will that the cortes should be assembled in such place as should appear most convenient; that at first they should occupy themselves exclusively in attending to the levies and subsidies necessary for the defence of the kingdom, and that their sittings should be permanent to determine what should be done on future events (9).—The disgraceful means, of which the emperor availed himself to obtain the renunciation of the crown of Spain in his favour, have already been known; but the violence of Buonaparte to accomplish his purposes did not terminate there. Blinded as he was by the extravagance of his ambition, he could yet discern how easily these acts of renunciation would be disposed of; and therefore he endeavoured to confirm them by the means of a council, which he called a national assembly, and which was to be convoked at Bayonne (10).—He named about 150 Spaniards, of different classes, conditions, and corporations, to constitute this assembly, but only about 90 were convened. A part of these, representing some cities, tribunals, or public bodies, brought with them instructions in the nature of powers given them by those whom they represented, but wholly insufficient to answer the purpose intended. The ministers of the council were without any powers or instructions whatever, a precaution adopted by this tribunal in conformity to the opinion of its commissioners, in order to avoid all involuntary compromises. Most of the deputies had no other powers than merely an order to take their departure, and many of them did not belong to any public body, or acknowledged class of the community.—The emperor fully expected, from the acquiescence of these individuals, a mask under which to conceal his usurpation. But he was utterly deceived. Instead of finding weak men convenient to the designs of his mercenary ambition, he was met by ministers incorruptible, grandees worthy of their rank, and representatives who were faithful defenders of the interest and of the honour of their country. They all, with one accord, informed him that they held powers much restricted, that they were not the legitimate representatives of Spain, and that they could not compromise her rights.—These and other similar reflections were treated with insolence in the tribunal of the usurper, who, far from being discomfited, put into activity all the means of oppression, flattering himself that by victories on the

(8) The perfect agreement between the recommendation of the king given to the junta, in his royal decree of the 5th of May, and the determination of his faithful vassals, is very remarkable. We have seen that all the provinces of the monarchy rose spontaneously to resist the oppressor, without having any knowledge of the will of their sovereign.

(9) "We, the three secretaries of the king, for decrees, certify, that we have seen and read in Bayonne, the two original decrees sent by his majesty Ferdinand VII. on the 5th of May, in this year, which are mentioned above; and the substance and contents of them, as far as we can recollect, is the same as is here stated.—Eusebio de Bardaxi y Azara.—Luis de Onio.—Evaristo Perez de Castro."—*Madrid, Sept.* 1, 1808.

(10) It is well known that this junta was assembled at Bayonne, according to printed notice given on the 19th of May, to treat, as it was said, of the means of securing the happiness of Spain, but in fact, to propose the continuance of all the evils of the former system, and such reforms and alterations as were most likely to destroy the whole country, and every province belonging to it.

one hand and corruption on the other, he should so colour over injustice that he would not be considered by the world as the subverter of general tranquillity.—I do not enter into the particulars that occurred in this congress; but one of the ministers of the council of Castile, who does so much honour to his robe, will satisfy the curiosity of the public as to this particular.—I ought not to speak of what I have suffered for my king and country: the truth is, I have not suffered, for all I have done has been required by my most sacred duties. It was to me the highest satisfaction to see my lodging in Bayonne surrounded by the satellites of government: to these spies succeeded, who abound always where those are in authority who in history usurp the characters of heroes. My steps were reckoned—my visits observed—espionage, under the mask of compassion, approached to examine the secrets of my soul; but nothing disturbed the tranquillity of my mind. What I could not behold with patience, was to see myself condemned to a confinement within the frontier of France, until the emperor should consider that my narration of the scandalous proceedings could not destroy the lofty fabric of the new Spanish monarchy. In vain, for two months, I applied to the minister for foreign affairs with the utmost importunity to be permitted to return to my beloved country; the determined resistance I made to the attempt of usurpation made the French government deaf to my entreaties, believing, not without good reason, that I should endeavour to inflame heroism in my country, denominated insurrection in the journals of Bayonne.—In such unfavourable circumstances, a mode presented itself to me of avoiding a state of indefinite banishment. Such were the repeated entreaties of Joseph Napoleon that I should continue with him in the situation of minister, to which I acceded with repugnance and from constraint, but without prejudice of my right to abandon it at a convenient opportunity.—This opportunity occurred the moment I set foot in Madrid. From that instant I only thought of availing myself of the most early means of resigning my new character, which I did in the manner shewn in document No. 12.—Joseph Napoleon could not be grieved at the disappearance of a minister who so frequently opposed his wishes (11)

and who, in the opinion of some of those who immediately surrounded him, was a Quixote in his maxims, who could not comprehend the sublime intentions of the greatest of heroes in favour of the regeneration of Spain.—I have shewn in this narratives with clearness and fidelity, the series of the principal events in this important epoch, carefully avoiding to enter into minute particulars foreign to my object, or which should make this exposition too prolix; and I have endeavoured to place before my readers, in its true point of view, all the injustice and violence with which the French government has conducted itself towards our beloved sovereign and the whole nation.—It has already been proved, that the renunciation of Ch. IV. in favour of his son Ferdinand VII. is vitiated in no respect. In the slight sketch which we have drawn of the perfidious and deceitful arts with which the emperor has made the progress we have seen, the series of atrocious insults offered to Spain, and to the unfortunate king Ferdinand VII, remains depicted in indelible colours.—The emperor alarms Ch. IV. in order that he may induce him to take flight for America, with all the royal family, and abandon the peninsula to the former; he lights up the flame of discord between the royal parents and their child, in order to debilitate Spain, dividing it into parties, after having disgraced the royal persons; he draws Ferdinand VII. from his court by false promises; he makes him captive in Bayonne; and when he saw that the virtue of the young king knew how to resist his designs, and that Ferdinand could not be induced to renounce his crown, he occasioned him to be brought to Bayonne, with all the other personages of the royal family, as if to present them bound before the imperial tribunal, which was both judge and party in the same cause. He endeavours to deprive the parents of the sensibilities of nature, and forces them to become the instruments of the oppression of their child. From the latter he extorts a renunciation (the most irregular and illicit transaction amongst the affairs of men), and by a series of abdications exacted by the same illegal and violent expedients, he believes that he has become the proprietor of the crown of Spain; he transfers it to his brother, without considering the infamy to which he would be exposed in the cabinets of Europe, by the usurpation of the throne of a monarch, his friend and ally.—Who can doubt from

(11) I may particularly instance the affair of the oaths, when Joseph Buonaparte arriving at Madrid, wanted to compel every body to swear allegiance to him; and that of the banishment of the council of Castile to Bayonne for its noble resistance.

this clear evidence, that the renunciation executed by Ferdinand VII. in favour of his august father, and that which succeeded in favour of the emperor, are absolute nullities? Who will doubt, but that, if the last should have emanated from a free exercise of the will, the rights of the dynasty of Bourbon are not prejudiced by it? Who does not know, that in case of the extinction of such a family, and by the very establishment of the Spanish monarchy, the nation alone can invite another dynasty, or can introduce such a form of government as it shall most approve?—In another part of this narrative I have shewn, that Ferdinand VII. was too honourable to suppose that the emperor could entertain such atrocious designs. The king desired to free Spain from the oppression of the French troops; it was promised him, that this and all other matters should be regulated with the emperor, and that he should return to his kingdom with the fruit of his exertions for the good of his vassals; and no hour of his life was unseasonable to him to exert himself for their happiness. This I saw, and can testify. During his confinement, nothing afflicted his generous heart so much as the sufferings of his people; and when his liberty began to be doubtful, he adopted the means the most agreeable to his paternal solicitude: such was the order which he gave for the regency, naturally sought when his freedom was interrupted; and such was the demand that the Cortes should be assembled to determine those questions, which in their proper places have been noticed.—Valour and patriotism have successfully armed the whole nation in its own defence, and for the protection of their legitimate sovereign, although the people had no knowledge of the will of their beloved Ferdinand as to this movement. That patriotism, united to wisdom, will now impel them irresistibly to perform with promptitude the most important work of the central government or regency, which may administer the affairs of the kingdom in the name of his majesty.—Thus will be completed for the advantage of all, the last expression of the will of the king, which he condescended to use the moment before he was forced to renounce the crown; thus will the nation be preserved from this dreadful tempest; it will have exhibited before Europe an example of loyalty, honour, and generous energy, which will be the subject of admiration in every age and in every country.—Madrid, Sept. 1, 1808.—PEDRO CEVALLOS.

DOCUMENTS.

No. I.—*Secret Treaty between his Catholic Majesty, and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the high contracting Parties stipulate every thing respecting the future Condition of Portugal.—Fontainbleau, October 27, 1807.*

We, Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitution, Emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, having seen and examined the treaty concluded, arranged, and signed at Fontainbleau, October 27, 1807, by general of division Michael Duroc, grand marshal of our palace, grand knight of the legion of honour, &c. &c. in virtue of the full powers conferred by us upon him for this purpose, with Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, honorary councillor of state and of war to his majesty the king of Spain, who was also furnished with full powers by his sovereign, which treaty is of the following tenor:—His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, and his Catholic majesty the king of Spain, wishing to regulate by common consent the interest of the two states, and to determine the future condition of Portugal, in a way that shall be consistent with sound policy as to both countries, have named for their ministers plenipotentiary; that is to say, his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, general of division Michael Duroc. grand marshal of the palace, grand knight of the legion of honour: and his catholic majesty, king of Spain, Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, his honorary councillor of state and of war, both which ministers having exchanged their full powers, have agreed as follows:—Article I. The province of Entre Mino y Duero, with the city of Oporto, shall be made over, in entire property and sovereignty to his majesty the king of Etruria, with the title of king of Northern Lusitania. II. The province of Alaetejo, and the kingdom of the Algarves, shall be made over, in entire property and sovereignty, to the Prince of Peace, to be by him enjoyed under the title of prince of the Algarves. III. The provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estramadura, shall remain undisposed of until there be a general peace, to be then disposed of according to circumstances, and conformably with what may be agreed upon between the two high contracting parties. IV. The kingdom of Northern Lusitania shall be held by the descendants of his Majesty the king of Etruria hereditarily, and according to the laws of succession which are established in the family

on the throne of Spain. V. The principality of the Algarves shall be held by the Prince of Peace hereditarily, and according to the laws of succession which are established in the family on the throne of Spain. VI. If there should be no descendants or legitimate heirs of the king of Northern Lusitania, or of the prince of the Algarves, these countries shall be disposed of by investure by the king of Spain in a manner so that they shall never be united under one head or annexed to the crown of Spain. VII. The kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves shall acknowledge as protector his catholic majesty the king of Spain, and in no case the sovereigns of those countries shall make peace or war without his consent. VIII. In case that the provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estramadura, held in sequestration, should devolve at a general peace to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which the English have conquered from Spain and her allies, the new sovereign of these provinces shall have, with respect to his catholic majesty the king of Spain, the same obligations as the king of Northern Lusitania, and the prince of Algarves, and shall hold them under the same conditions. IX. His majesty the king of Etruria cedes the kingdom of Etruria, in full property and sovereignty, to his majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy. X. As soon as the provinces of Portugal shall be definitively occupied, the different princes who are to possess them shall mutually appoint commissioners to ascertain their natural boundaries. XI. His majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy guarantees to his catholic majesty, the king of Spain, the possession of his dominions on the continent of Europe, situated to the south of the Pyrenees. XII. His majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy, engages to recognize his catholic majesty, the king of Spain, as emperor of the two Americas, when every thing is ready for his majesty's assuming that title, which may be either at the general peace, or at farthest within three years therefrom. XIII. The two high contracting powers shall mutually agree upon an equal partition of the islands, colonies, and other transmarine possessions of Portugal. XIV. The present treaty shall be kept secret. It shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Madrid, within twenty days, at the latest, from the date of its signature.—Done at Fontainbleau, October 27, 1808 (Signed) DUROC.—E. IZQUIERDO.

We have approved, and do hereby approve, of the preceding treaty, and all and every of the articles therein contained. We declare it to be accepted, ratified, and confirmed; and promise that it shall be inviolably observed. In witness whereof, we have executed these presents, signed with our own hands, and sealed with our imperial seal, at Fontainbleau, the 29th day of Oct. 1807. (Signed) NAPOLEON. The minister of foreign affairs, CHAMPAGNY. The secretary of state, MARET.

No. II.—*Secret Convention concluded at Fontainbleau between his Majesty the King of Spain and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the two high contracting Parties adjust all that relates to the Occupation of Portugal.—At Fontainbleau, 27th October*, 1807.

Napoleon, by the grace of God and the contitution, emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, having seen and examined the convention concluded, arranged, and signed, at Fontainbleau, on the 27th of October, 1807, by the general of division Michael Duroc, grand marshal of our palace, grand cordon of the legion of honour, &c. &c. in virtue of the full powers with which we thereto conferred upon him, on the one side; and on the other side by D. Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, honorary councillor of state and of war to his majesty the king of Spain, equally furnished with full powers by his sovereign—the tenor of which convention is as follows:—His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, and his catholic majesty the king of Spain, being desirous of entering into an arrangement with respect to the occupation and conquest of Portugal, according to the stipulations of the treaty signed this day, have appointed, viz. His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the confederation of the Rhine, the general of division Michael Duroc, grand marshal of his palace, grand cordon of the legion of honour, and his catholic majesty the king of Spain, don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, his honorary councillor of state and of war, who, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the following articles.—I. A body of French imperial troops, consisting of 25,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, shall enter Spain, and march direct for Lisbon; they shall be joined by a body of 3000 Spanish infantry and 3000 cavalry, with 30 pieces of artillery.—II. At the same time a division of Spanish troops, consisting of

10,000 men, shall take possession of the province of Entre-Minho-Douria, and of the city of Oporto; and another division of 6000 men, also consisting of Spanish troops, shall take possession of Alentejo, and the kingdom of Algarves.—III. The French troops shall be subsisted and maintained by Spain, and their pay shall be provided by France during the time occupied by their march through Spain.—IV. The moment that the combined troops have entered Portugal, the government and administration of the provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estremedura (which are to remain in a state of sequestration) shall be vested in the general commanding the French troops; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of France. The provinces that are to form the kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves, shall be administered and governed by the generals commanding the Spanish divisions which shall enter the same; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of Spain.—V. The central body shall be under the orders of the commander of the French troops, to whom also the Spanish troops attached to that army shall pay obedience. Nevertheless, should the king of Spain or the Prince of Peace think fit to join the said body, the French troops, with the general commanding them, shall be subject to their order.—VI. Another body of 40,000 French troops shall be assembled at Bayonne by the 20th of November next, at the latest, to be ready to enter Spain for the purpose of proceeding to Portugal, in case the English should send reinforcements therein, or menace it with attack. This additional corps, however, shall not enter Spain until the two high contracting parties have come to an agreement on that point.—VII. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at the same time with those of the treaty of this date.—Done at Fontainbleau, 27th October, 1807. (Signed) DUROC.—E. IZQUIERDO.

We have approved, and hereby approve, the foregoing convention, in all and every of the articles therein contained, declare it to be accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and pledge ourselves that it shall be inviolably observed.—In witness whereof, we have executed these presents, signed with our own hand, countersigned and sealed with our imperial seal at Fontainbleau, the 29th October 1807. (Signed) NAPOLEON. The Minister of foreign affairs, CHAMPAGNY. The secretary of state, H. MARET.

No. III.—*Letter from his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine.*

My Cousin,—I have received your royal highness's letter. Your highness will have been already convinced, by the inspection of the papers of your royal father, of the regard that I have always manifested towards him. Your highness will permit me, under the present circumstances to address you with frankness and sincerity. I entertained an expectation that, on my arrival at Madrid, I should have persuaded my illustrious friend to make some necessary reforms in his dominions, which would give considerable satisfaction to the public feelings. The removal of the prince of Peace appeared to me to be indispensible to his happiness and the interests of his people. The events of the north have retarded my journey, and the occurrences at Aranjuez have supervened. I do not constitute myself judge of the events which have taken place, or of the conduct of the prince of the Peace; but certain it is that it is very dangerous for kings to accustom their subjects to shed blood, and to take the administration of justice into their own hands. I pray God that your highness may not one day find it so. It would not be conformable to the interests of Spain, to proceed severely against a prince who is united to a princess of the royal family, and has so long governed the kingdom. He no longer has any friends. As little will your royal highness find any, should you cease to be fortunate. The people eagerly avenge themselves for the homage which they pay us. Besides, how could the prince of Peace be brought to trial, without implicating in the process the king and queen, your royal parents? Such a proceeding would foment animosities, and excite seditious passions, the result of which might be fatal to your crown. Your royal highness has no other right to it, but what you have derived from your mother. If the cause injures her honour, your royal highness destroys your own claims. Let not your highness give ear to weak and perfidious counsels. Your highness has no right to try the prince of Peace. His crimes, if any are imputed to him, disappear, and merge in the prerogatives of the crown. I have frequently expressed my wishes, that the prince of Peace should be removed from the management of affairs. If I did not persevere in my applications, it was on account of my friendship for king Charles, and a wish (if possible) not to see the weakness of his attachments. O wretchedness of human nature! imbecility and error! such is our lot! But an arrangement may

take place, the prince of Peace may be banished from Spain, and I may offer him an asylum in France.—With respect to the abdication of Charles IV. that event having taken place at the moment when my armies were in Spain, it might appear in the eyes of Europe and posterity that I had sent all those troops merely for the purpose of expelling my friend and ally from his throne. As a neighbouring sovereign, I ought to inform myself of all the circumstances which have occurred, before I acknowledge his abdication. I declare to your royal highness, to the Spaniards, and to the whole world, that if the abdication of king Charles be voluntary, and has not been forced upon him by the insurrection and tumults at Aranjuez, I have no difficulty in regarding and acknowledging your royal highness as king of Spain. I am therefore anxious to have some conversation with your royal highness on this subject. The circumspection which I have observed for the last month upon this point, ought to convince your highness of the support which you will find in me, should it ever happen that factions of any kind should disturb you on your throne. When king Charles informed me of the events of the month of October last, the communication gave me the greatest pain. I flatter myself that my representations contributed to the happy issue of the affair of the Escurial. Your royal highness is not altogether free from blame: of this, the letter which you wrote to me, and which I have always wished to forget, is a sufficient proof. When you are king, you will know how sacred are the rights of the throne. Every application of an hereditary prince to a foreign sovereign is criminal.—The marriage of a French princess with your royal highness, in my opinion, accords with the interests of my people, and I more especially regard it as a circumstance which would unite me by new ties to a house, whose conduct I have had every reason to praise since the time that I ascended the throne. Your highness ought to dread the consequences of popular commotions. It is possible that assassinations may be committed upon some stragglers of my army; but they would only lead to the ruin of Spain. I have learnt, with regret, that some letters of the captain general of Catalonia have been circulated at Madrid, and that they have had the effect of exciting some irritation. Your royal highness knows the inmost sentiments of my heart. You will perceive that my attention is occupied by various points, which require to be finally decided; but you may be assured that I shall, under all circumstances, conduct myself towards your person in the same manner as I have done towards the king your father. I beg your royal highness to be persuaded of my anxiety to bring every thing to a happy conclusion, and to find opportunities of giving you every proof of my affection and esteem. My cousin, I pray God to take you into his high and holy keeping.—(Signed) NAPOLEON. *Bayonne, April* 16, 1808.

No. IV.—*Instructions furnished to his Excellency Don Pedro Labrador.*

Most excellent Seignor—Your excellency is acquainted with the propositions made on the day of the king's arrival in this city, and of what passed at the conference in which I discussed them with the minister of foreign affairs. The propositions recently made by the latter, differing in some respect, but no less inadmissible, are of the following tenor:—1. That the emperor has irrevocably determined that the Bourbon dynasty shall no longer reign in Spain. 2. That the king shall cede his rights to the crown both in his own name and that of his sons, should he have any. 3. That should this point be agreed upon, the crown of Etruria shall be conferred upon him and his descendants, according to the terms of the salique law. 4. That the infant Don Carlos shall make a similar renunciation of his rights, and that he shall have a right to the succession to the crown of Etruria, in default of issue of the king. 5. That the kingdom of Spain shall henceforth be possessed by one of the brothers of the emperor. 6. That the emperor guarantees its complete integrity, and that of all its colonies, without suffering a single village belonging to it to be separated from it. 7. That in like manner he guarantees the preservation of religion, property, &c. &c. 8. That should his majesty refuse those propositions, he shall remain without compensation, and his imperial majesty will carry them into execution by consent or force. 9. That if his majesty agree and demand the niece of the emperor in marriage, this connection shall be immediately secured on the execution of the treaty.—These propositions were discussed in the junta where the king presided. I there stated my opinion, which was adopted by your excellency and the other members, and approved by his majesty who is desirous that instructions should be prepared for your excellency accordingly. Your excellency knows that promises the most flattering, and assurances the most positive, were made and given to the king by the grand duke of Berg, by the ambassador of France, and by general Savary, by direction of the emperor, who said that no ob-

struction would arise to his acknowledgment as sovereign of Spain; that nothing was desired hostile to the preservation of the integrity of the kingdom; and you are apprised that these representations drew him from Madrid to pay his compliments to his intimate ally, who he supposed would return with him to the capital, from the statements of those three, and where splendid accommodations were provided for the emperor. The journey of his imperial majesty was deferred; but the king, seduced by new promises, made by general Savary in the name of his imperial majesty, continued his progress to this city.—Your excellency should ask M. Champagny if the king be at full liberty, and if he be so he may return to his dominions, and give audience to the plenipotentiary, to whom the emperor may confide his powers. If not free, your excellency knows that every act is absolutely nugatory; and consequently whatever may be agreed will have no other effect than to stain the reputation of the emperor before the whole world, the eyes of which are fixed upon his conduct, and who knows what Spain has already done in favour of France.—I have shewn to your excellency the treaty of the 27th Oct. last, by which the emperor has guaranteed the integrity of Spain in the person of the king, with title of emperor of the two Americas. Nothing has intervened to destroy this treaty; on the contrary, Spain has added new claims to the gratitude of France.—The king has resolved not to yield to the importunity of the emperor; neither his own honour, nor his duty to his vassals, permit him to do so. These he cannot compel to accept the dynasty of Napoleon; much less can he deprive them of the right they have to elect another family to the throne when the reigning family shall be extinct.—It is not less repugnant to the feelings of the king to receive, as a compensation, the crown of Etruria; for, besides that that country is under the authority of its legitimate sovereign, whom he would not prejudice, his majesty is contented with the crown that Providence had given him, has no wish to separate himself from his subjects, whom he loves with paternal affection, and from whom he has received the most unequivocal proofs of respectful attachment.—If on account of this refusal the emperor should think fit to resort to force, his majesty hopes that Divine justice, the dispenser of thrones, will protect his just cause, and that of his kingdom.—As your excellency is deeply penetrated with these principles, and has already displayed them with that energy with which justice arms the man of probity, and the zealous friend to his king and country, it is needless for me to detail prolix instructions for your guide, you being a minister, in whose patriotism and affection to the royal interests his majesty reposes full confidence.—God preserve your excellency many years.—Pedro Cevallos. (For Don Pedro Gomez Labrador).—*Bayonne, April* 27, 1808.

No. V.—*Official Dispatch from Don Pedro Cevallos to the Minister of State of the Emperor of France, of the* 28*th April*, 1808.

Most Excellent Sir,—Although the agitation of mind, to which the whole Spanish nation would have been subject, has hitherto been restrained by what has been printed and published by the grand duke of Berg, and by all the French generals in that country, indicating the sentiments of peace and good understanding which the emperor of the French and king of Italy was desirous of maintaining with the king my master; and also on account of the assurances which the ambassador of his imperial majesty in Madrid, the grand duke of Berg, and general Savary, had given to his majesty of the approaching arrival of the emperor in the said city; on which account, the king determined to proceed to Burgos to meet him, to shew this public mark of his affection, and of the high esteem he had for his person—it has now become impossible longer to answer for the tranquillity of such a numerous people; especially as they are apprised that the king has been six days in Bayonne, and they have no assurance of his return to Spain. In such a state of affairs, his majesty must be anxious for the repose of his beloved subjects, and for this purpose to return to their bosoms to tranquillize their agitation, and attend to the heavy demands of public business, as his absence would expose his people to incalculable mischiefs, which would fill his heart with the most poignant grief. This speedy return, his majesty promised in the most solemn manner to his people, grounding his engagement on the assurances of the emperor, that he should shortly be restored to his country, and acknowledged to be her sovereign by his imperial majesty.—His majesty has, therefore, ordered me to communicate to you these observations, for the purpose of your submitting them to the consideration of his imperial majesty, whose approbation they will doubtless meet; and his majesty, my master, is ready to treat in his dominions with his imperial majesty on all convenient subjects, with such per-

son as the emperor should be pleased to authorize for that purpose. (*)

No. VI.—*Royal Decree addressed to the Supreme Council of Castile by Ferdinand VII.*

Soon after the prince of Peace was arrested, frequent and earnest entreaties were made by the grand duke of Berg, by the ambassador of France, and by general Savary, in the name of the emperor, my intimate ally, that he should be delivered up to the French troops, that he might be conveyed to France, where his imperial majesty would order him to be tried for the offences he had committed. These solicitations were generally accompanied with threats in case of a refusal to carry him off by force In Vittoria they were repeated with equal importunities; and I wishing to form the most prudent determination, consulted with the duke of Infantado and the Infant Carlos, with don Juan Escoiquiz, and with don Pedro Cevallos, my principal secretary of state. This minister, on that occasion, said: "Sire, if I were to yield to my own personal feelings, I should immediately recommend the surrender of the prince of Peace. But such a sentiment ought to be stifled, and in truth I do stifle it when I contemplate the duty you owe to your own sacred person, and the obligations you are under to administer justice to your subjects injured by don Manuel Godoy. This obligation is essential to the sovereignty, and your majesty cannot disregard it without treading under foot whatever is most respectable among men. Under this view, I think you ought to answer the emperor, informing him, at the same time, that your majesty has offered to your august parents to save him from the penalty of death, should he be capitally convicted by the council. By your compliance with this proposal, your majesty will give to the world a proof of your magnaminity, to your beloved parents a proof of your affection, and the emperor will be gratified in observing with what wisdom you discharge the demands of justice, and conciliate the expectations of his imperial and royal majesty."—All approved of this salutary advice, and I did not hesitate a moment in adopting it, and proceeded to act upon it. —I communicated it to the council with the fit circumspection to serve for their information and direction; and also that they may take the most active measures to protect the houses and families of the four denounced persons.—I THE KING.—*Bayonne, April 26, 1808.*—To the president of the council.

No. VII.—*Letter of the King to his Father, Charles IV.*

My honoured Father and Lord—Your majesty has admitted that I had not the smallest participation in the proceedings at Aranjuez, intended, as is notorious, and as your majesty knows, not to disgust you with your throne and government, but to maintain both, and not to abandon the vast multitude whose maintenance depends upon the throne itself. Your majesty also told me that your abdication had been spontaneous, and that if any one should attempt to persuade me it was otherwise I should not believe them, for it was the most pleasing act of your life. Your majesty now tells me, that though your abdication was certainly an act of your own free will, you nevertheless reserved in your mind a right to resume the reigns of government when you should think proper. I have therefore inquired of your majesty, if you were disposed to resume your sceptre, and your majesty has replied that you neither would return to the throne or to Spain. Notwithstanding this, your majesty desires me to renounce in your favour a crown, conferred upon me by the fundamental laws of the kingdom, on your free resignation of it. To a son who has always been distinguished for his love, respect, and obedience to his parents, nothing that can require the exercise of these qualities can be repugnant to his filial piety, especially when the discharge of my duty to your majesty, as a son, is not in contradiction to the relation I bear, as a king, to my beloved subjects. In order that both these, who demand my highest regard, may not be offended, and that your majesty may be pleased with my obedience, in the present circumstance, I am willing to resign my crown in favour of your majesty, under the following limitations:—1. That your majesty will return to Madrid, whither I shall accompany you and

(*) This dispatch was not answered, and produced an effect precisely the contrary of what might have been expected in a regular course of things. The spies within, and the guards without the palace were doubled. The king for two nights, endured the insult of an alguazil, who, stationed at the door, ordered his majesty and the infant Don Carlos to retire to their apartments The first time the insult was offered, the king complained in severe terms, on which the governor employed polite language, and manifested much disapprobation of such conduct; but this did not prevent the repetition, and probably this offensive circumstance would have been repeated, had not the king abstained from going out at night.

serve you as the most dutiful son —2. That there a cortes should be assembled; or, if your majesty should object to so numerous a body, that all the tribunals and deputies of the kingdom should be convoked.—3. That in the presence of this council my renunciation should be executed in due form, and the motives stated which induced me to make it. These are, the love I bear to my subjects, and my wish to make a return for their affection towards me, by securing their tranquillity, and relieving them from the horrors of a civil war, by means of a renunciation, having for its object your majesty's resumption of the sceptre, and your return to govern subjects worthy of your love and affection.—4. That your majesty should not be accompanied by individuals who have justly excited the hatred of the whole nation.—5. That should your majesty, as I am informed, be neither disposed to reign in person, not to return to Spain, in such case, that I should govern in your royal name as your lieutenant. There is no one who can have a claim to be preferred before me. I am summoned thereto by the laws, the wishes of my people, and the love of my subjects; and no one can take more zealous and bounden interest in their prosperity. My renunciation, confined within these limits, will appear in the eyes of the Spaniards a ew proof of my preferring their preservation to the glory of governing them, and Europe will deem me worthy of governing a people to whose tranquillity I have shewn myself ready to sacrifice whatever is most flattering and alluring in human estimation. That God may preserve the important life of your majesty for many happy years, is the prayer of your loving and dutiful son, who prostates himself at your royal feet.—FERDINAND.—*Bayonne, May* 1. 1808.

No. VIII.—*Letter from Charles IV. to his Son Ferdinand.*

My Son—The perfidious counsels of the men who surround your person, have placed Spain in a critical situation. The Emperor alone can save her.—Ever since the peace of Basle, I have been firmly persuaded that the essential interests of my people were inseparably connected with the preservation of a good understanding with France. No sacrifice has been omitted by me in order to obtain this important object. Even when France was under the direction of ephemeral governments, I suppressed my private feelings and listened only to the dictates of policy, and the welfare of my subjects.—When the Emperor re-established order in France, great difficulties were removed, and I saw new motives to continue attentive to the former system of alliance. When England declared war against France, I happily endeavoured to continue neuter, and to preserve to my people the happiness of peace. England afterwards possessed herself of four of my frigates, and made war upon me, even before it had been declared; and then I was under the necessity of opposing force to force; and the calamities of war, to my subjects, were the consequence.—Spain, environed by coasts, and indebted for a great portion of her prosperity to her ultra-marine possessions, suffered by the war more than any other state. The interruption to her commerce, and all the destruction incident to such a situation, affected my subjects, and some of them had the injustice to attribute these events to my ministers.—At last, I had the happiness to see my kingdom tranquil within, and free from inquietude, so far as respected the integrity of my dominions, I being the only one among the kings of Europe who sustained himself amid the storms of these later times. Spain yet enjoyed this tranquillity, not then obstructed by those councils which have misled you from the right path. You have too easily permitted yourself to be misled, by the aversion of your first wife towards France; and you have thoughtlessly participated in the injurious resentments indulged against my ministers, against your mother, and agains myself. —It was now necessary to recollect my own rights as a father and a king. With this view, I caused you to be arrested, and I found among your papers the proof of your crime. But at the commencement of this career, I melted at seeing my son on the scaffold of destruction, and I admitted my sensibility to be excited by the tears of your mother. I forgave you, notwithstanding my subjects were agitated by the deceitful expedients of a faction, of which you have yourself been the declared leader. From that instant I resigned all the tranquillity of my life, and was compelled to add to the distresses I felt for the calamities of my subjects, the afflictions occasioned by the dissentions in my own family.—My ministers were calumniated to the Emperor of the French, who believing that the Spaniards were disposed to renounce his alliance, and seeing the discord that prevailed even in the bosom of my own family, under various pretences, inundated my provinces with his troops.

(To be continued.)

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